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JURISDICTION OVER THE APPEAL
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-4-103(2)G).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue No. 1: Park City's denial of the Bakers' application was an
administrative act. The Bakers applied to Park City to amend the Holiday Ranchettes
Subdivision plat for the purpose of subdividing their existing lot into two lots. Park City
was required to apply laws already in existence, specifically Park City's Land
Management Code {"LMC"), in making a decision on the Bakers' application concerning
their specific lot. In deciding the Bakers' application, Park City was not creating laws of
general applicability. Park City issued an administrative-style denial letter containing
findings of facts and conclusions of law explaining the basis for the denial, which is not
standard for a legislative denial. Did Park City act legislatively in denying the Bakers'
application to subdivide their lot as found by the District Court?
Standard of Review: The determination of whether an action is legislative or
administrative in nature is a legal conclusion reviewed for correctness with no particular
deference given to the district court. Citizens for Responsible Transp. v. Draper City,
2008 UT 43, ,r,r 8, 11; Suarez v. Grand County, 2012 UT 72, ,r 18.
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Preservation of Issue No. 1: Issue No. 1 was presented to the District Court and

preserved for appeal when it was briefed, argued during the hearing on Cross Motions for
!J

Summary Judgment, and addressed in the District Court's Ruling and Order ("Order"). 1
Issue No. 2: The Municipal Land Use Development and Management Act
("MLUDMA") provides that Park City's denial of the Bakers' application must be
supported by substantial evidence. Park City Council's denial of the Bakers'

application was a final decision of a land use authority or appeal authority. MLUDMA,
Vi}

Utah Code § 10-9a-801, requires that such decisions be supported by substantial
evidence. Did the District Court err in applying the more deferential "reasonably
debatable" standard of review to Park City's denial of the Bakers' application?
Standard of Review: Matters of statutory construction are questions of law that

are reviewed for correctness. Taghipour v. Jerez, 2002 UT 74, ,I 8. A district court's
grant of summary judgment is a legal ruling reviewed without deference. Suarez v.
Grand County, 2012 UT 72, ,I 18. The determination of whether an action is legislative
l..tW

or administrative in nature is a legal conclusion reviewed for correctness with no
particular deference given to the district court. Citizens for Responsible Transp. v.
Draper City, 2008 UT 43, 11 8, 11.

1

(R. 237-39, 266-69, 336-37, 356-64, 371-76.)
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Preservation of Issue No. 2: Issue No. 2 was presented to the District Court and
preserved for appeal when it was briefed, argued during the hearing on Cross Motions for
Summary Judgment, and addressed in the Order. 2

Issue No. 3: Park City's denial of the Bakers' application was arbitrary and
capricious. In denying the Bakers' application to subdivide their lot, Park City invented
a new standard of review for the Bakers' application not included within MLUDMA or
the LMC- "compatibility" within "the direct neighborhood" - which was then applied to
the Bakers to compare only the lot depth and overall size of a handful of lots located on
one side of Little Kate Road while not including properties in closer proximity to the
Bakers' lot (including those directly across the street) as part of the Bakers' "direct
neighborhood." Park City then based its denial on four conclusions which were
unsupported by the record before it:
1. "The proposed plat amendment is not consistent with the Park City Land
Management Code and applicable State Law regarding lot combinations."
2. "There is Good Cause to deny the proposed plat amendment as the plat does
cause undue harm on adjacent property owners because the proposal is not
compatible with existing Single Family development (lots) in the near
proximity."

2

(R. 266-67, 338-39, 356-64, 371~76.)
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3. "Approval of the plat amendment does adversely affect health, safety, and
welfare of the citizens of Park City."
4. "The public will be materially injured by the proposed plat amendment as the
proposed plat amendment is not compatible with the direct neighborhood in
terms of lot size and depth." 3
Was Park City's denial of the Bakers' application arbitrary and capricious because
it was not supported by substantial evidence?

Standard of Review: MLUDMA requires that in reviewing a land use decision, a
court must presume that Park City's decision was valid. UTAH CODE§ 10-9a801(3)(a)(i). The Court is to provide deference to the land use authority's decision, but
may reject the decision if it is so unreasonable as to be arbitrary, capricious after
considering all evidence in the record, both favorable and contrary to the decision.

Carlsen v. Board ofAdjustment of City of Smithfield, 2012 UT App 260, ,r,r 4-5.
"Substantial evidence" is that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate
to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion." Carlsen, 2012 UT App 260,, 4.
A district court's grant of summary judgment is a legal ruling reviewed without
deference. Suarez, 2012 UT 72, 118. The appellate court reviews the land use
authority's decision "as if the appeal had come directly from the agency when the district
3

J..Ji

The District Court found the record does not show substantial evidence in support of
this Conclusion, "However, the court need not ratify all of the Council's conclusions of
law in order to find that the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record."
(R. 333.)
9
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court's review of the [land use authority's] decision was limited to a review of the [land
use authority's] record." Carlsen, 2012 UT App 260, iJ 3.

Preservation of Issue No. 3: Issue No. 3 was presented to the District Court and
preserved for appeal when it was briefed, argued during the hearing on Cross Motions for
Summary Judgment, and addressed in the Order.4

Issue No. 4: Park City's denial of the Proposed Amendment was not
reasonably debatable. If the District Court did not err is applying the reasonably
debatable standard, was Park City's denial of the Bakers' application and its four
conclusions arbitrary and capricious under the reasonably debatable standard?

Standard of Review: MLUDMA requires that in undertaking a review of a land
use decision, a court must presume that Park City's decision was valid. UTAH CODE §
10-9a-801(3)(a)(i). The Court is to provide a high degree of deference to legislative land
use decision, and review only whether the ordinance or decision in questions "could
promote the general welfare; or even if it is reasonably debatable that it is in the interest
of the general welfare." Peterson v. Riverton City, 2010 UT 58, ,r 12. A district court's
grant of summary judgment is a legal ruling reviewed without deference. Suarez, 2012
UT 72, 1 18. The appellate court reviews the land use authority's decision "as if the
appeal had come directly from the agency when the district court's review of the [land

4

(R. 170-77, 271, 354-56, 382-83, 338-39.)
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use authority's] decision was limited to a review of the [land use authority's] record."

Carlsen, 2012 UT App 260, 13.
Preservation of Issue No. 4: Issue No. 4 was presented to the District Court and
preserved for appeal when it was briefed, argued during the hearing on Cross Motions for
Summary Judgment, and addressed in the District Court's Ruling and Order. 5

Issue No. 5: Park City's denial of the Bakers' application was illegal.
MLUDMA provides that a land use authority may approve a plat amendment if it finds
there is good cause for the amendment. The Bakers' application satisfied all zoning
requirements of the LMC. The Bakers' proposed subdivision would result in a benefit to
the Bakers by permitting them to construct a small, single level retirement home on the
newly created lot. However, Park City denied the Bakers' application based on a finding
that the application was not "compatible" within the "direct neighborhood" which Park
'-3

City concluded was "good cause" to deny the application. Was Park City's denial of the
Bakers' application illegal when it misapplied the "good cause" standard? Was Park

~

City's denial of the Bakers' application illegal when it failed to find good cause to
approve a zoning-compliant application which would result in a benefit to the Bakers
without any resulting "fiscal or environmental impacts" or undue harm to Park City? Did
Park City's denial violate the ''fundamental fairness" requirement of Section 10-9a-

102( 1)?
5

(R. 170-77, 237-40, 337-38, 360, 364-96.)
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Standard of Review: Determination of whether a land use decision is illegal
"depends upon a proper interpretation and application of the law." Carlsen, 2012 UT
App 260, ~ 3. "These are matters for [the appellate court's] determination, and we accord
no deference to the district court or the [land use authority]." Patterson, 893 P .2d at 604.
"A determination of illegality requires a determination that the decision, ordinance, or
regulation violates a law, statute or ordinance in effect at the time the decision was made
or the ordinance or regulation adopted." Utah Code Ann.§ 10-9a-801 (3)(d).
"Furthermore, because [land use laws] are in derogation of a property owner's commonlaw right to unrestricted use of his or her property, provisions therein restricting property
uses should be strictly construed, and provisions permitting property uses should be
liberally construed in favor of the property owner." Patterson, 893 P.2d at 606.

Preservation of Issue No. 5: Issue No. 5 was presented to the District Court and
preserved for appeal when it was briefed by both parties, argued during the hearing on
Cross Motions for S~mmary Judgment, and addressed in the Order. 6

Issue No. 6: Park City's denial of the code-compliant land use application
based on the mere potential for undefined "aesthetic harm" was not a proper
exercise of police power. MLUDMA provides that the land use may be regulated to
"provide for the health, safety and welfare" of the community, generally referred to as the
government's "police powers." Park City argues that in denying the Bakers' application,
6

(R. 177-79, 234-37, 336, 370-71.)
12
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Park City was protecting the health, safety and welfare of its community by protecting
against potential, undefined "aesthetic harm." There is no authority in Utah to support
~

the proposition that the police powers may be used to regulate inconsequential aesthetic
deviations for which there is no threatened negative impact on public health, safety or
welfare (de minimis non curat lex). Did the District Court err in finding that Park City's
conclusion that "approval of the plat amendment docs adversely affect health, safety, and
welfare of the citizens of Park City" based on the potential for perceived aesthetic harm -

~

"detract[ing] from the orderly development of the City as a whole"-was supported under
both the substantial evidence or reasonable basis standards?
Standard of Review: MLUDMA requires that in undertaking a review of a land
use decision, a court must presume that Park City's decision was valid. UTAH CODE §
10-9a-801(3)(a)(i). The Court is to afford deference to the land use authority's decision,
but may reject the decision if it is so unreasonable as to be arbitrary and capricious after
considering all evidence in the record, both favorable and contrary to the decision.

Carlsen, 2012 UT App 260, ,r,r 4-5. "Substantial evidence" is that quantum and quality
of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a
conclusion." Carlsen, 2012 UT App 260, ,I 4. The Court is to provide a high degree of
deference to legislative land use decision, and reviewed only whether the ordinance or
decision in questions "could promote the general welfare; or even if it is reasonably
debatable that it is in the interest of the general welfare." Peterson, 2010 UT 58, ,r 12. A
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district court's grant of summary judgment is a legal ruling reviewed without deference.

Suarez, 2012 UT 72, il 18. The appellate court reviews the land use authority's decision
"as if the appeal had come directly from the agency when the district court's review of
the [land use authority's] decision was limited to a review of the [land use authority's]
record." Carlsen, 2012 UT App 260, ,r 3.
~

Preservation of Issue No. 6: Issue No. 6 was presented to the District Court and

preserved for appeal when it was briefed, argued during the hearing on Cross Motions for
Summary Judgment, and addressed in the District Court's Ruling and Order. 7

~

STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND REGULATIONS

Utah Code Ann.§ 10-9a-801 (attached as Addendum B).
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-609 (attached as Addendum C).
Park City Land Management Code§ 15-2.11-3 (attached as Addendum D).
Park City Land Management Code§ 15-7.1-1 et seq. (attached as Addendum E).

7

(R. 305-311, 321-325, 339, 379-84, 388-95.)
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
The Bakers are appealing Park City's denial of their application to amend the plat
for the Holiday Ranchettes Subdivision ("HRS"). Through the requested amendment the
~

Bakers sought lo subdivide their one-acre lot, upon which their currently existing home is
located, into two separate lots so that they may build their retirement home on the newly
created lot (the "Proposed Amendment"). The two resulting lots would have been fully
compliant with all applicable objective standards in the LMC (e.g., lot size, width, depth,
etc.).
MLUDMA provides that a plat shall be amended if there is good cause and no
public street, right-of-way or easement has been vacated or amended. 8 Utah Code Ann.§
10-9a-609 (1). Under Utah law there is a presumption that a zoning-compliant

~

subdivision application will be approved absent clear and compelling public interest. The
Bakers' proposed subdivision would comply with all applicable zoning standards in Park
City's LMC. Park City expressly found that the Proposed Amendment would not create
"significant fiscal or environmental impacts." Despite these findings, Park City denied
the Proposed Amendment relying on four specific findings labeled "conclusions of law."
The Planning Commission staff invented a new, arbitrary standard of review,
unsupported by MLUDMA or the LMC, which was applied to the Proposed Amendment:
8

There is no evidence in the Record that a street, right-of-way or easement will be
impacted by the Proposed Amendment.
15
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"compatibility" with the "direct neighborhood." Rather than weigh the benefits and
potential negative impacts that would result from the Proposed Amendment, Park City
was distracted with debating the definition of "neighborhood" - whether it includes only
single family lots in the platted subdivision in which the Bakers' lot is located; whether it
includes both sides of the street upon which a lot is located; or whether it includes
properties within a defined radius (300/600/900) feet - as well the appropriate parameters
for determining "compatibility" between lots - focusing on separation between houses,
average lot width, average lot depth, setbacks, average lot size.
The Planning Commission ultimately concluded that the Bakers' "direct
neighborhood" consists of a handful of lots on only one side of Little Kate Road while
excluding properties in closer proximity to the Bakers' lot, specifically lots directly across
the street, which are smaller than the lots resulting from the Proposed Amendment. The
Planning Commission staff also narrowed the characteristics that detennine "compatibility"
to include only lot size, lot width and lot depth. The Planning Commission staff
acknowledged that while the Bakers' lot is the widest, and the Proposed Amendment would
not result in incompatibility with this characteristic, the Proposed Amendment is
"incompatible" based on overall size and lot depth.
These factors are largely irrelevant and have essentially no bearing on the nonexistent impacts to be caused by the Proposed Amendment which would result in lot sizes
permissible and compliant with the requirements of the LMC. Only birds, drones or planes
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~

flying above proposed lots would have noticed any difference between the proposed two
lots and anything else in the neighborhood however that concept is defined.
Lt>

Nor do these characteristics have anything to do with the grounds advanced by the
City for denying the Proposed Amendment related to ''undue harm," "material injury," "the
health, safety and welfare of the citizens of Park City" or "inconsistencies" with the LMC or

~

State law. The Planning Commission, and later the Park City Council, adopted the
proposed findings drafted by the Planning Commission staff. However, the Planning

~

Commission and City Council did not so much as discuss many of the "findings" and
"conclusions" they ultimately adopted. Nonetheless, the Planning Commission
recommended that the City Council deny the Bakers' application for the Proposed
Amendment, and upon receiving such recommendation the City Council made the final
decision to deny the Bakers' application. Neither the Planning Commission nor the City
Council articulated any actual harm caused by the Proposed Amendment.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On September 29, 2014, the Bakers filed an appeal of Park City's denial of their
application for the Proposed Amendment. (R. 1-5.) Before the District Court, the Bakers
argued that Park City's denial was arbitrary, capricious and illegal. (R. 5.) The Bakers
argued that the applicable standard of review is whether or not Park City's decision was
supported by "substantial evidence" as pursuant to MLUDMA, "a final decision of a land

17
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

use authority or an appeal authority is valid if the decision is supported by substantial
evidence in the record and is not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal." (R. 169.)
The Bakers argued that the "Findings of Fact" and "Conclusions of Law" upon
which Park City's denial of the Proposed Amendment is based are not supported by
substantial evidence in the record, not even reasonably debatable or are irrelevant. (R. 17077 .) The Bakers argued that Park City's decision was illegal because it was based on an
arbitrary, invented standard of "compatibility'' within the "direct neighborhood" and
misapplication of the "good cause" standard even though the Proposed Amendment
complies with all zoning requirements of the LMC. (R. 177-82.)

DISPOSITION BELOW
The Bakers and Park City filed cross motions for summary judgment. (R. 140-42,
199-201.) The District Court granted Park City's motion and denied the Bakers. In its
Order, the District Court determined that in denying the Bakers' application for the
Proposed Amendment Park City was acting in a legislative, not administrative, capacity.
(R. 336.) Accordingly, the District Court held that the proper standard of review of whether
Park City denial was arbitrary, capricious or illegal is whether the decision was "reasonably
debatable". In other words, the District Court determined that it could only overturn Park
City's "decision if it is not reasonably debatable, meaning that there is no 'reasonable basis'
for the decision or that the decision is wholly discordant to reason and justice." (R. 337.)
The District Court found, "it is reasonably debatable that the Plaintiffs' application did not
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show good cause for the plat amendment, pursuant to UCA § 10-9a-609 (1)." (R. 337.)
The District Court further found each of Park City's four "conclusions of law" were
reasonably debatable. (R. 337-38.)
In the alternative, the District Court held that if Park City's decision was
administrative in nature and subject to the "substantial evidence" standard, "there is
substantial evidence in the record to support a conclusion that the Plaintiffs application did
not demonstrate good cause pursuant to UCA § 10-9a-609(1)." (R. 338.) The District

Gb

Court found substantial evidence in support of the Council's conclusions that, "The
proposed plat amendment is not consistent with the Park City Land Management Code and
applicable State Law regarding lot combinations" and that "There is Good Cause to deny
the proposed plat amendment as the plat does cause und[ue] harm on adjacent property
owners because the proposal is not compatible with existing Single Family development
(lots) in the near proximity." (R. 338.) The District Court further found "substantial
evidence in the record showing that the Plaintiffs' proposed plat amendment was not
compatible with existing developments and would therefore detract from the orderly
development of the City as a whole supports the Council's finding regarding the general
health, safety, and welfare of the City." (R. 339.) However, the District Court found "the
record does not show substantial evidence in support of the Council's conclusion that, "The
public will be materially injured by the proposed plat amendment as the proposed plat
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amendment is not compatible with the direct neighborhood in terms of lot size and depth."
(R. 339.)

The District Court's Order disposed of all claims in the action before it and
constitutes a final judgment according to Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R.
340.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Property
1.

The Bakers' prope1iy is located at 1851 Little Kate Road, which is also

known as Lot 83 of HRS ("Property"). (R. 14, at ~~ l , 3.)
2.

The Property and the area around it is shown below in a Google Earth

photograph. (R. 151.)

3.

HRS, platted in 1974, contains a total of 102 lots and is 170.98 acres.

(R.14, at~~ 25- 27.)
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4.

The Property is one of two lots in HRS which arc cxcmpl from lhl: HRS

CC&Rs and Declaration, including any restriction or prohibition against re-subdivision
~

contained therein. (R. 15, at ,r,r 22, 23; R. 69 at ii 6.7.)
5.

The Property is located on the "outer rim of the subdivision", with homes

across the street belonging to the Park Meadows Subdivision No. 5 consisting of single
Cj)

family homes on lots ranging from .249 to .801 acres. (R. 15, at 1128-30.)
6.

The four lots directly across the street from the Property average .33 acres

each. (R. at 15, at 134.)
7.

The Property is at the "confluence" of three different neighborhoods with a

variety between the spacing and size of the various dwellings, including high density
condominiums, the MARC Building9 and a golf course across the street from the
Property. (R. 34-36, 43.)

~

8.

The Property is either .999 or exactly 1 acre in size. (R. 14, at ,r,r 4, 5.)

9.

The Bakers have occupied the home that currently sits on the Property for

approximately 18 years. (R. 15, at ,r 17 .)
10.

The Bakers submitted an application in October 2012 to amend the HRS

plat to subdivide the Bakers' lot into two lots and allow for the construction of another
single family dwelling on the other lot ("New Lot") which was accepted by the Planning
Department in November 2012. (R. 30 and. 77.)

w

9

The MARC is an 85,000 square foot recreation/fitness complex located in close
proximity (the very large, commercial-style building with the swimming pool in the
photo at Fact No. 2) to the Proposed Amendment. (R. 152.)
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~

Applicable Park City Land Management Code

11.

The Property is located in Park City's Single Family ("SF") District. (R.
~

14,at,r2.)
12.

Purpose statement B of the SF District is "to allow for SF Development

Compatible with existing Developments." (R. 15, at ,r 31) (quoting, without citation,
LMC § 15-2.11-1 (B).)
13.

A Single-Family Dwelling is an allowed use in the SF District. (R.14, at ,r
~

8)
.
14.

The maximum density for Subdivisions in the SF District is three (3) units

per acre. (R.14, at ,r 10.)
15.

The minimum lot area in the SF District is 14,250 square feet or 1/3 acre.

(R.14, at ,r 10.)
16.

The Proposed Amendment would allow for the Bakers' existing home, as

well as a to-be constructed home on the New Lot, to be fully compliant with all
applicable zoning requirements of the LMC, specifically for use, density (lot size),
setbacks, height and parking. (R. 15, at ,r 20; R. 68.)
a. Proposed lot 83a (containing the currently existing home) would be .605
acres, approximately 26,353.8 square feet. (R. 15, at ,r 18.)
b. The New Lot (proposed lot 83b) would be .395 acres, approximately
17,206.2 square feet. (R. 15, at ,r 19.)
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17.

There are no significant fiscal or environmental impacts from the Proposed

Amendment. (R. 17, at 1 63.)

The Planning Commission's Recommendation to Deny the Proposed Amendment
18.

In reviewing the Proposed Amendment, the Planning Commission staff

determined that the focus of the analysis was whether the Lot and the Proposed
Amendment were compatible with the surrounding neighborhood. (See R. 66, 69-71, 8889.)
19.

No conclusions were reached at the initial May 14, 2014 Planning

Commission meeting, however, the Planning Commission expressed the need for more
information and to further define the considerations to be weighed in making a decision.
(R. 91, 96.)
20.

Specifically, the Planning Commission had differing opinions on the

subjective nature of the analysis urged by the staff, including whether to include
condominiums in the "neighborhood" analysis and determining "what feels like the
neighborhood." The Commission disagreed as to which characteristics of nearby lots
should be included in considering "compatibility" of the Proposed Amendment. 10 (R. 9094.)

10

1./iJ

One such disagreement focused on the importance of overall lot size, which cannot be
accurately assessed from street view, as compared to lot width. (R. 92) ("Commissioner
Campbell believed they were getting an unnatural metric by measuring by lot size. From
the standpoint of walking or driving by, he thought that looking at the length of the lot
and frontage along the road was a more meaningful metric ... He believed [the two lots
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Ci)

21.

The Planning Commission staff determined "it would be appropriate" to

look at "adjacent homes in the vicinity," expressly including properties located across the
street. (R. 66; see also R. 88, "In looking at the existing development the Staff thought it
was better to do an analysis of the neighborhood rather than all of[HRS].") (Emphasis
added.)
22.

The Planning Commission generally rejected a set measurement analysis

(300/600/900 foot radius), believing that considerations of "neighborhood" compatibility
"should be based on what a normal person on the street would describe the
neighborhood." (R. 66.)
23.

The Commission staff read the LMC's definition of "Good Cause." (R. 93.)

24.

At the meeting, Mr. Schueler of Alliance Engineering, hired by the Bakers,

explained his reasoning as to why the Proposed Amendment was a "good project": "it
creates additional density within an existing streetscape with existing utilities and roads.
It is a walkable community and this project would add to the walkable element .... And
this project would support the same distances between houses because the [other] lots are
long and skinny." (R. 89.)
25.

Meeting notes indicate that Dr. Baker cited several reasons why the

Proposed Amendment would benefit the community, however, the articulated reasons

created by the Proposed Amendment] would still have as much road frontage as most of
their neighbors.")
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~

~

were not included in the Record. (R. 95, '''Dr. Haker cited all the reasons why it benefits
the community.")
26.

The Commission discussed density, specifically a supposed ''community-

wide consensus" that the '!,majority" does not want increased density in existing
neighborhoods. (R. 93-94, Commissioner Phillips noted that the City remained neutral
on the issue of density and that there was no policy of "discouraging" additional density
in the General Plan.)
27.

At the meeting, Planning Commissioner Campbell stated discomfort over

lhe: thought 11 of "every lot" having the righl lo request a plal amendment and asked a City
attorney if denying the application would be 'l,a defensible ·position for the City." (R. 91.)
28.

A City attorney advised that denial "would be based on the compatibility

issue." (R. 91.)
29.

At the continued July 23, 2014 Planning Commission meeting, the Planning

Commission staff recommended that the Proposed Amendment be denied and urged a
~

finding of "incompatibility." (R. 113.)
30.

"Planner Astorga clarified that the negative recommendation was only

based on the facts of lot depth and the size of each lot" in the "neighborhood." (R. 114.)
(Emphasis added.)

11

There is no rational or legal basis for this unsubstantiated speculation.
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31.

Planner Astorga further noted that these two factors of alleged

Iii

incompatibility already exist on the Property and would not result from the Proposed
Amendment. (R. 113.)
32.

The depth of the Property is 141 feet. (R. 121.)

33.

The average depth of lots on the same side of the street as the Property is

414 feet, while the average depth of the four lots directly across the street is 131.75 feet 12 •
(R. 121, at ,r,r 49-51.)

34.

Planner Astorga noted that behind the Property (i.e., the visual appearance

of the "depth" of the lot) is a privately owned hill that "per the CC&Rs ... is to remain
open area." (R. 113.)
35.

Accordingly, without looking at a map containing boundary lines, the

Property's lack of depth is not noticeably apparent. (R. 114, Commissioner Campbell
reiterating that "people judge compatibility by what they see walking or driving by ...
depth would only be an issue from an aerial view.")
36.

The Bakers were blind-sided by the negative recommendation as it was the

first they learned of it. (R. 113, "Commissioner Campbell recalled that the Staff was
more in favor of this plat amendment at the last meeting."); (R. 113, the Planning staff
gave the impression that it wanted to find incompatibility, "Planner Astorga did not
believe this was an appropriate study [on width of lots] because the Staff would not be
12

Finding of Fact 1 50 contains a mistake and states "width" instead of "depth." Width
measurements of the lots across the street are set forth in 143.

26
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

able to find incompatibility because it would be consistent with the other structures in the
neighborhood; and it would meet the CC&Rs and the LMC. ") The Bakers had not
~

prepared to counter the recommendation at the meeting with witnesses and additional
evidence in support of the Proposed Amendment. (R. 33.)
3 7.

Dr. Baker opposed the recommendation that "compatibility" be determined

based on overall size and depth, as other characteristics, such as length, are more of a
focus for "street view" compatibility. (R. 116.)
38.

From the street view, the Property has the longest street frontage in the

neighborhood as it is the widest lot. (R. 16, at 1144-47) (the average lot across the street
is 118 feet wide; the average lot in the neighborhood is 131 feet wide; the Property is 233
feet wide.)
39.

Dr. Baker also opposed the Planning stafrs new, incredibly limited,

definition of a "neighborhood" including only single family homes on the same side of
the street. (R. 114-15.)
40.

Dr. Baker informed that he had consulted with the University of Utah

Urban Planning Department to get a professional opinion on the definition of a
"neighborhood" which, according to the parameters he was given, include the MARC
building and condos across the street. The Urban Planning Department determined that
the Proposed Amendment "was consistent with current planning practices of taking
advantage of existing infrastructure and amenities." (R. 114-15.)
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41.

Dr. Baker noted that construction of an "outbuilding", such as a large barn,

is permitted on the Property; however, the City (and therefore public) would benefit more
from the Proposed Amendment as it would realize more tax revenue from a new home as
opposed to construction of a barn. (R. 115.)
42.

Two members of the public spoke against the Proposed Amendment at the

hearing, including a representative of the HRS HOA and the Bakers' adjacent neighbor,
Hap Seliga. (R. 115-16.)
43.

The HOA argued that only its subdivision should be considered for

compatibility purposes and not properties across the street, and surmised (utterly
irrelevantly) that the Property was never intended to be developed. (R. 115-16.)
44.

Mr. Seliga argued that the Proposed Amendment would be inconsistent

with the "look and feel of the neighborhood", that his property already receives a great
deal of noise pollution, and an unspecified "material impact" on the value of his property.
(R. 116.)
45.

At the July 23, 2014 hearing, three of the Commissioners articulated that

they did not find Good Cause for the Proposed Amendment, but none of the
Commissioners clearly weighed potential positive benefits against harmful impacts:
a. Commissioner Joyce came to the conclusion that the "neighborhood"
should only include HRS and not houses or condos directly across the
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~

street. (R.116.) He fu1ther stated that economic gain for the applicant (the
Bakers) was not a convincing reason or Good Cause. (R. 117.)
b. Commissioner Phillips stated he "was on the fence." He agreed that the
proposed New Lot appears to be an empty (buildable) lot. However, he
"struggled to find Good Cause". His decision was based on '~having [the
~

Property] that is already unique from the rest of the neighborhood and
dividing it into two even more differentiated lots." (R. 117.) He
considered potential negative impact to neighbors, but the concern was
offset by equal impact if a barn is built on the Property. (R. 11 7-18.)
c. Commissioner Strachan was also "borderline" but could not find
satisfaction of the "statutory definition for Good Cause." His comments
focused only on suggestions for defining ''neighborhood compatibility" in
the future. (R. 118, suggesting the condos would not be included in
"comps" and therefore should be excluded from consid~ration.)
46.

Other Commissioners reached their decision without express

consideration of Good Cause:
a. Commissioner Campbell concluded that both sides of the street, separated
vi

by only twenty feet, are all one neighborhood. As a former resident of the
neighborhood, he always assumed the empty portion of the Property was an
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empty lot that would be built upon. He considers it a "why not?" rather

~

than a "no" in terms of the Proposed Amendment. (R. 117.)
b. Commissioner Gross, an owner in HRS, believed the Bakers have "the
ability to do whatever they want with their property." However, he did not
support the subdivision because he believed it would be inconsistent with
the lot sizes within HRS (i.e., defining the "neighborhood" as HRS and
ignoring other nearby properties). (R. 117.)
c. Commissioner Stuard noted the Property is uniquely shaped and smaller
and already does not fit with the neighborhood. He also made his decision
based on public opinion during amendments to the General Plan (not
Gt...

specific to the Property) that the community was not in favor of allowing
new subdivision within an existing subdivision. (R. 117.)
4 7.

The Commission voted to forward a negative recommendation on the

Proposed Amendment to the City Council by a 5-1 vote. (R. 118.)
48.

The Commission's decision was allegedly "based on" pre-drafted Findings

of Fact and Conclusion of Law found in the Staff report. (R. 118.)
49.

The majority of the 61 paragraphs of Findings of Fact in the Staff Report

were not actually "found," or even discussed, by the Commission. (R. 118-19.)
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(ij

50.

The majority of the Findings of Fact concern the size and dimensions of the

Prope11y and of surrounding properties, which facts are largely irrelevant to a Good
~

Cause determination. (R. 118-19.)
51.

Further, the Findings of Fact do not support the pre-drafted Conclusions of

Law. (R. 118-23.)
52.

The Conclusions of Laws adopted by reference were not discussed or

considered by the Commission in reaching their decision. (R. 122-23.) Specifically, the
following conclusions were not explained or arrived at by the Commission:
a. "The proposed plat amendment is not consistent with the [LMC] and
applicable State Law regarding lot combinations." (R. 120, at iJ 1.) 13
b. "The public will be materially injured by the proposed plat amendment as
the proposed plat amendment is not compatible with the direct
neighborhood in terms off lot size and depth." (R. 120, at if 2.)1 4
c. Approval of the plat amendment does adversely affect health, safety and
welfare of the citizens of Park City." (R. 121, at if 3.) 15

•

d. "There is Good Cause to deny the proposed plat amendment as the plat
does cause undo [sic] harm on adjacent property owners because the

13

No "inconsistency', was or has ever been specified by the City.
No "material injury" was or has ever been specified by the City nor is such even
imaginable.
15
No "adverse[ ] affect" was or has ever been specified by the City nor is such even
imaginable.

14
i.:f)
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proposal is not compatible with existing Single Family development (lots)
in the near proximity." (R. 121, at ,r 4.) 16

The City Council's Hearing and Denial of the Proposed Amendment
53.

~

The Proposed Amendment and the Planning Commission's

recommendation of denial came before the Park City Council ("Council") for hearing on
September 4, 2014. (R. 18, 22-59.)
54.

The Planning Department provided the Council with a Staff Report dated
<tt

September 4, 2014. (R. 63-64.)
5 5.

In the analysis of Character & Compatibility section of the Staff Report, the

Planning Department concluded: "Given the purpose statement B of the [(SF)] District
which is to: "allow for Single Family Development Compatible with existing

Developments, Staff finds that the compatibility should not be limited to [the Property's]
own subdivision but to single family dwellings within a specific proximity." (R. 70.)
(emphasis in original.)
56.

The Staff concluded, without any real explanation, that compatibility

should be determined based only on single family dwellings on both sides of Little Kate
Road from Monitor Drive to Lucky John Drive, excluding multi-unit dwellings, the Park
City MARC and the golf course. (R. 70.)

16

No "harm", much less any undue harm, was or has ever been specified by the City nor
is such even imaginable.
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57.

Further down on the same page, under analysis of Lot Size, the Staff

contradicts and further limits appropriate comparables to only lots on the same side of the
~

street, and only to those in HRS. (R. 70, "Staff finds that in terms of compatibility the
lots on the same side of the street from Monitor Drive to Lucky Drive be included in the
compatibility comparison as Little Kate Road separates the character of each

~

subdivision.")
58.
@

At the hearing, Planner Astorga aclrnowledged that the Planning

Commission's determination of "non-compatibility" is based on depth of the Property as
it already exists:
Lot size is a function of two items, Width and depth, right? ... in terms of
structure separation alone ... we don't think there is an issue here. The next one
would be lot width .. the lot itself, which is the longest lot in the area ... there is
not an issue in terms of compatibility. Front yard setback. This is the one that we
said that we don't think that we should look into this one because there is so much
flexibility ... And then the last one, which is ... lot depth ... the issue with the site
is the existing lot. If you look at it without the requested plat amendment, you see
that lot right there, the one in blue, seems like it's out of place.
(R. 39.)

59.

Addressing the Commission's concerns on lot size, Dr. Baker testified of

the lack of consistency throughout the neighborhood, showing that less than 300 feet
from his home lot sizes ranged from .24 to 2.5 acres, with varying setbacks and home
sizes. (R. 33-34.)
60.

Addressing the Commission's concerns on lot depth, Dr. Baker noted, "As

our planner pointed out at the Planning Commission meeting, from the street it's
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impossible to determine the depth of a lot. From the street, a home on [the New Lot]
would look similar to all the lots along Little Kate as a long, narrow lot ... Our current
home is set back 33 feet from the street. And our house is compatible in the
neighborhood. How can our house, with a 33' setback, be comparable to a new house on
the [New Lot], with a [proposed] 59' setback on a same depth lot, and not be
compatible?" (R. 35.)
61.

Dr. Baker also pointed out that the Conclusions of Law adopted by the

Commission were not consistent with any evidence in the record and/or were flawed. (R.
37-38.)
62.

At the hearing, two members of the public spoke in favor of the Proposed

Amendment, and two against it. (R.41-42.)
63.

Mr. Seliga again complained that his lot is already burdened with a great

deal of "noise pollution" from the neighboring condos and the Bakers' existing home and
that he did not want additional noise from another home. He also made a vague
unsupported assertion that the Proposed Amendment might "devalue" the investment in
his home and its "appeal" on re-sale. (R. 40-41).
64.

One Council member questioned whether the Proposed Amendment would

result in "additional impact" to the neighbor considering the already existing damage.
(R. 41) ("Well, I'm wondering what additional impact that house would have on the ways
that already exist. You're identifying a fair amount of neighborhood noise that travels up
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to you because of, you know, the logistics ... I mean, it's, that's kind of tough-I don't
know. That's a little bit of a tough call I would think, to just say that that's going to add

~

to the already existing noise.")
65.

The other person who spoke against the Proposed Amended, a

representative of the HOA, again provided an unsupported guess that even though the
Bakers have lived on the Property for over eighteen ( 18) years, it was never intended to
be developed. (R. 42-43.)
66.

Council Member Henney noted that there is no evidence is support of such

assumption and that the opposite assumption, that the HOA always intended and
considered that the Property be appropriate for subdivision, is also plausible:
I'm wondering about the statements that have been made by the [HOA]. And in
the report there doesn't seem to be any idea of the intent originally to kind of place
the house, the existing house where it is, and leave this space that's available on
the right-hand side for, you know, we don't lrnow why. But then it's excluded
from the anti-subdivision clause in the CCRs. And nobody seems to know why.
And it, and so we jump to the assumption that, um, you know, it was never viewed
as appropriate for subdivision, but it was excluded from the subdivision clause.
Well, that's a pretty interesting jump to make. 'Cause you could just as easily say,
well it was obviously considered as appropriate for subdivision, which is why it
was excluded from the CC&Rs subdivision clause.
(R. 46.)
vJ

67.

Planner Astorga responded that while he doesn't have evidence of the

intent concerning the Property, the alternate assumption that the Property may have never
been intended to be built upon is based on the fire department's historical pumping of
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water from the well on the Property. (R. 47.) ("Again, that's an assumption. I, I don't
know if that's exactly what happened ... I wasn't willing to write that [in the report].")
68.

City Attorney Harrington noted, "I think the lack of historical record on, on

this is challenging." (R. 49.)
69.

The concern was echoed by the Mayor:
When I look at this aerial photograph of Dority Springs image and I look
down on that and look at the placement of the structures and houses, uh,
you know, I, I'm not particularly bothered by seeing that additional
footprint in there. But I am bothered by, you know, the, the historical
questions with regard to what this, how this may have evolved. And I
would like to see more information on that.

(R. 55) (Emphasis added.)
70.

Council Member Peek noted observations inconsistent with an assumption

that the Property was not intended to be built on: "They labeled it, gave it a lot number in
the subdivision plat, or CC&Rs, and didn't label it with a different key." (R. 58.)
71.

Council Member Matsumoto stated that a conclusion of the intent

concerning the Property can be made without evidence of the facts, based on "common
sense" and personal perception:
I was asked to, to use my common sense. And, and so when I look at the
aerial view of this, I look at it and I go, well that property is weird, why
would anybody do that, other than the fact that there's wetlands there, they
were using it a water supply. And I only can - my assumption is that there's no proof of it, but that is such an out-of-place lot that my
assumption is that that was never supposed to be a lot, but they found a way
to carve a house out of it.
(R. 47) (Emphasis added.)
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72.

Council Member Matsumoto followed-up by concluding that the

"neighborhood" of the Property should be limited to HRS and not include properties
directly across the street from the Property, noting that the Park Meadows area has "many
neighborhoods." (R. 48-49.)
73.

Council Member Peek concurred with Matsumoto's conclusion, adding that

the roads in the area define the subdivisions, and therefore "neighborhoods." Peek
further noted that the Property is "different than the other ones" in its "neighborhood" as
defined by him (HRS). (R. 55.)
74.

Council Member Simpson disagreed with Council member Matsumoto's

assessment that the Property's "neighborhood" is limited to HRS and does not include
properties across the street and otherwise within 300 feet of the Property:

4ci)

I, I don't buy the neighborhood compatibility argument. I, I, I really
hate to go against Planning Commission, but as far as I'm concerned when
I look at it, it looks like it's more part of Carol's neighborhood that it does
anything else. And I, you know, I, I'm just struggling with it. I, I would
prefer, I would prefer to either understand more about the history of how
this lot ended up that way, or remand it back to the Planning Commission
so that the neighbors who are in support of this get a chance to chime in ....
I think that, that when there are this many things that this subdivision is
compatible with, and those two, lot depth and lot size, which are basically
a function of the original HOA decision to plat these lots this way. And the
HOA originally decided to allow this unit, this lot to subdivide. You know,
it just, it makes no sense to me ... I think, for me there's a question of
fairness. And if the Baker's bought their lot with the understanding that
they could subdivide it(R. 52) (Emphasis added.)
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75.

The Mayor commented that his interpretation of the Property's

"neighborhood" is also more broad than HRS: "this particular neighborhood and this, this
strange cross section. It's a merging of various neighborhoods." (R. 56.)
76.

Virtually every member of the Council made comments regarding the lack

of evidence of historical intent of permissible uses of the Property being "cause for
concern", and also contributed his or her interpretation of the Property's neighborhood.
(R. 22-59.)

77.

Concerning the standard of Good Cause, the City attorney noted that there

is "broader language" defining the standard. (R. 49, Council member Matsumoto asking
for "an explanation about good cause for subdivision," to which City Attorney
Harrington provided a reference to the page number containing a full definition in the
Staff Report and represented, "And it does, it does include, you know broader language.
The public benefit is one component. There can be others. So it is a case by case
determination based on the evaluation of all this section.")
78.

The Council failed to discuss the competing considerations under the LMC

standard of Good Cause as applied to the Proposed Amendment. (R. 22-59.)
79.

Despite the failure to assess Good Cause, the Council unanimously voted to

deny the Proposed Amendment. (R. 59.)
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80.

The following day, the Council transmitted its "Notice of Denial"

containing a number of supposed "Findings of Fact" and "Conclusions of Law" identical
@

to those adopted by the Corrµnission. (R. 14-17.)
81.

Similar to the Planning Commission, at the hearing the City Council never

discussed the "Conclusions of Law" which they adopted and which are not supported by
the Findings of Fact or the record. (R. 14-59.)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Park City's denial of the Bakers' application for the Proposed Amendment is to be
reviewed under the "substantial evidence" standard as expressly proscribed by
MLUDMA. The substantial evidence standard also applies because the decision, which
concerned changes to only the Bakers' lot, was administrative in nature.
Park City's decision was arbitrary and capricious because there is not substantial
evidence in the record to support the conclusions upon which Park City's denial is based;
there is not even enough evidence to support the denial W1der the less stringent
~

"reasonable basis" standard. Specifically, there is no evidence: 1) that the Proposed
Amendment is inconsistent with the LMC or state law; 2) that material injury to the
public would result from a perceived incompatibility with the direct neighborhood based
on lot size and depth; and 3) that the Amendment would adversely affect the health,
safety or welfare of the citizens of Park City. Contrary to the denial, there was Good
Cause to support the Amendment. Further, denial of the Amendment based on a
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(Ii)

perceived potential for unidentified "aesthetic harm" is an improper exercise of the police
power and violates "fundamental fairness".

ARGUMENT
I.

Denial of the application for the Proposed Amendment was administrative
in nature and must be supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Pursuant to MLUDMA, Park City's decision on the Proposed Amendment must be

~

"supported by substantial evidence" if the decision being appealed is a "final decision of a
land use authority or an appeal authority." Utah Code Ann.§ 10-9a-801. The standard of
review is lessened to "reasonably debatable" if the decision being appealed is "a decision,
ordinance, or regulation involving the exercise of legislative discretion." Utah Code Ann.§
10-9a-80 I. As Park City's denial of the Bakers' application was a final decision of a land
use authority or appeal authority, based on the plain language of MLUDMA the "supported
by substantial evidence" standard should apply. Stampin ' Up, Inc. v. Labor Comm 'n, 2011

UT App 147, ,I 7.
While the Court need not engage in the unnecessary practice of determining whether
Park City's final decision as a land use authority was administrative or legislative, Park
City's consideration of the Bakers' application for the Proposed Amendment is clearly
administrative in nature. The Court must look to the nature of the act to determine whether
Park City was exercising legislative or administrative authority. Suarez v. Grand County,
2012 UT 72, ,r 19. "Legislative power gives rise to new law, while [administrative] power
implements a law already in existence." Id. (quoting Carter v. Lehi City, 2012 UT 2).
40
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4v

Administrative acts aim "at applying the law to particular individuals or groups based on
individual facts and circumstances." Id. While legislative power concerns "promulgation
of laws of general applicability and is based on the "weighing of broad, competing policy
considerations.'" Id. A legislative act "applies to everyone within the geographical area
over which that body has jurisdiction or to everyone within a category of persons engages in
a particular activity." Id. A rule of general applicability "sets the governing standard for all
cases coming within its terms." Id.
Park City's consideration of the Bakers' application for the Proposed Amendment
was administrative in nature. Park City was to apply laws already in existence to the
application and allegedly considered facts and circumstances specific to the Bakers' existing
lot in denying the application. The Proposed Amendment - dividing the Bakers' existing
lot into two lots - does not concern promulgation of laws of general applicability, and did
not require weighing of broad, competing policy considerations. Further, the "good cause"
standard Park City allegedly applied to the Proposed Amendment expressly states that it is
to be determined on a "case by case basis." LMC § 15-15-1.114.
To the extent Park City exercised legislative authority in denying the Bakers'
application for the Proposed Amendment, such action was improper:
VJ
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[T]he constitutional limits on the legislative power are significant. By
granting the legislature the power only to make laws that apply broadly. our
constitutional tradition seeks to prevent unfair applications of the law to
specific individuals. When the legislative power is properly used by
weighing broad policy concerns to create a general "rule of conduct [that]
applies to more than a few people," the concern of a tyrannical majority
singling out one individual is greatly reduced.

Carter, 2012 UT 2, ,r 41 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added.)
Pursuant to Park City's rules of general applicability set forth in the LMC, the
Proposed Amendment satisfies all zoning requirements and the Bakers' application should
have been approved. Because Park City's decision to deny the Bakers' permit was
administrative in nature, Park City's denial is only valid if it is "supported by substantial
evidence in the record and is not arbitrary, capricious or illegal." Utah Code Ann.§ 10-9a801(3)(c).
For the reasons articulated below, Park City's decision is not supported by
substantial evidence in the record and should be overturned.

II.

Park City's decision was arbitrary and capricious when it is not supported
by substantial evidence in the record.
Park City adopted four Conclusions of Law upon which its decision is based. (R.

17, 122.) The Conclusions of Law are not supported by substantial, or really any,
evidence in the Record and are arbitrary and capricious.
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a. "The proposed plat amendment is not consistent with the [LMCJ and
applicable St.at.e T,aw regarding lot comhir•.d.ions. '' (R. 122, at. 1 1.)

The Record is devoid of any reference to or support for the conclusion that the
~

Proposed Amendment is inconsistent with "applicable State Law regarding lot
combinations." There is no indication of what ''State Law" Park City could be referring

~

to. In fact, there is no "State Law" on "lot combinations" that has anything at all to do
with the Proposed Amendment.
The conclusion that the Proposed Amendment is "not consistent with the Park City
[LMC] ... regarding lot combinations" is also unsupported by the Record. The Property
is located in the SF Development Zone and the Proposed Amendment would allow both
proposed lots to "meet code requirements under the [LMC]." (R. 14, at ,r 2, R. 15, at if
20.) There is no dispute that the Proposed Amendment would satisfy the density
requirements for the SF Development zone, specifically, lots of at least 1/3 acre. (R. 14,
at ,r 10.) Accordingly, the Proposed Amendment would completely comply with the
regulations and requirements of the SF Development Zone.
Park City's finding of alleged inconsistency with the LMC is based on one of the
stated "purposes" of the SF District, which is "to allow 17 for Single Family Development
''Compatible" 18 with existing Developments." (R.15, at ,r 31; R. 70.) Analysis of the
17

The purpose of "allowing" development, rather than limiting or restricting it, implies a
firesumption in favor of development that complies with the zoning regulations.
8
The Planning Staff interpreted "compatibility" to be determined by comparison of the
size and dimensions oflots. (R. 39.) However, as used in the LMC, "compatibility" is
typically used for the purpose of comparing building design and aesthetics. See LMC §
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purposes of the SF District is irrelevant to the Proposed Amendment. It is undisputed
that the Proposed Amendment would allow both lots to comply with all zoning and
density requirements of the SF District. Therefore, the Proposed Amendment would
necessarily be compatible with existing Developments within the SF District.
Consideration of whether a proposed use furthers a stated purpose of the SF District
would only be relevant if the Bakers were seeking permission to otherwise use property
within the SF District in a manner not expressly permitted in the SF District by the LMC.
Further, Park City did not deny the Proposed Amendment application based on a
determination of incompatibility with "existing Developments". Rather, Park City
applied an insupportably limited point of comparison of "surrounding lots on the same
side of the street" "from monitor Drive to Lucky John Drive." (R. 16, at ,I 38.) "Existing
Developments" is a broad reference of comparison which does not include any "direct
neighborhood," let alone "same side of the street" restriction. Neither does it state that
only single family residences shall be considered at the exclusion of other surrounding
existing development, including neighboring multi-unit dwellings, the Park City MARC
and golf course, or even the four single family lots directly across the street from the

15-2.11-l{C) (SF District purpose C, "maintain the character of mountain resort
neighborhoods with Compatible residential design."); LMC § 15-15-1.57 (defining
"Compatible or Compatibility" as "Characteristics of different Uses or designs that
integrate with and relate to one another to maintain and/or enhance the context of a
surrounding Area or neighborhood. Elements affecting Compatibility include, but are not
limited to, Height, scale, mass and bulk of Building, pedestrian and vehicular circulation,
parking, landscaping and architecture, topography, environmentally sensitive Areas and
Building patterns.")
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Property, each which average 1/3 of an acre. (R. 15, at ,r,r 33, 34.) Park City's
compatibility analysis excludes properties within 300 feet of the Bakers' home. (R. 16, at
@

,r 38, R. 70.)

To do so naturally disregards the character of the Property's location (an

intersection of different subdivisions and uses), rendering any superfluous "neighborhood
compatibility" analysis flawed, arbitrary and capricious. 19
If there is any ambiguity in what is meant in the LMC by "Existing Development"
it must be construed in favor of the Bakers' rights to develop the Property.
Furthermore, because zoning ordinances are in derogation of a property
owner's common-law right to unrestricted use of his or her property,
provisions therein restricting property uses should be strictly construed, and
provisions permitting property uses should be liberally construed in favor
of the property owner.

Rogers v. West Valley City, 2006 UT App. 302,

,r 15 (quoting Patterson v.

Utah County

Bd. OfAdjustments, 893 P.2d 602,606 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)).
There is no evidence in the Record that the Proposed Amendment violates a single
regulation, or is inconsistent with, the LMC or State Law. Accordingly, the Conclusion
~

of Law is arbitrary and capricious and cannot constitute a legitimate basis for the denial
of the Proposed Amendment.

19

~

See summary of testimony of neighbors in favor of the Proposed Amendment,
including that there is already a "very diverse spattering of uses in the neighborhood" all
of which must be considered compatible in the neighborhood as it already exists. (R. 2324.)
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b. "The public will be materially injured by the proposed plat
amendment as the proposed plat amendment is not compatible with the
direct neighborhood in terms of lot size and depth." (R. 122, at ,r 2.)
While the Record includes significant focus on the Planning Commission's

~

invented standard of "compatibility with the direct neighborhood in terms of lot size and
depth" there is not a shred of evidence in the Record concerning material injury that the
~

Proposed Amendment would supposedly cause to the "public," or even to adjacent
neighbors. 20 The Planning Commission devoted a great deal of effort to measuring and
considering various characteristics of the homes and lots in the surrounding area,
including by acreage, separation between houses, lot width and depth. (R. 15, at ,r,r 26,
30, 33-37; R. 16, at ,r,r 38-55.) The Planning Commission largely ignored the
characteristics of homes in the area which the Proposed Amendment would be
compatible with (width, structure spacing, lot size across the street and in the SF zone)
and provided little explanation as to the extra weight given to the two characteristic for
which the Proposed Amendment would be "incompatible" (overall lot size and depth).

Id.

20

The HOA did not provide evidence of potential injury. Rather, it objected to the
Proposed Amendment and advanced a theory that the Property was never intended to be
developed at all as an explanation as to why it was excluded from the CC&R's
prohibition on lot re-subdivision. (R. 109.) Consideration of the reason why the
CC&R's were drafted to exclude two specific lots is a red herring and irrelevant to Park
City's consideration of the Proposed Amendment. It is undisputed that the Property is
not subject to the CC&R's, further, Park City does not enforce CC&R's.
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Even if Park City's finding of alleged incompatibility is valid, Park City did not
find any resulting "material i~jury" to the public that would result from the Proposed
@

Amendment. There is no evidence that creation of two lots that satisfy the governing
density requirement (1/3 acre), but which have shorter depth than other lots (offset by the
fact that the rear of both lots is already open space), would negatively impact neighbors

~

or the public.
Evidence before the Planning Commission and the Council concerning alleged or
potential injury resulting from the Proposed Amendment consisted of an adjacent
neighbor, Mr. Seliga, voicing concern that the Proposed Amendment might contribute to
additional noise pollution, and the additional structure potentially create privacy concerns
and possibly decreasing the re-sale value of his lot. (R. 116.) Both the Planning
Commission and Council discounted Mr. Seliga's potential damages from consideration:
the Planning Commission noted that the possible negative impact to neighbors based on
the addition of another structure is cancelled out by the consideration that a construction
of a barn on the Property is permissible (R. 41 ); and that the already existing substantial
noise pollution issue coming from the nearby condominiums lessens or eliminates any
concern that the Proposed Amendment would cause new injury (R. 117-18.) While the
Planning Commission received letters in opposition from citizens, the letters were not

09
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discussed and did not appear to impact the City's decision. (R. 105-110.)21 It is simply
impossible, and not even reasonably debatable, that one additional single family home in
this neighborhood, however that terms is defined, that is fully compliant with the zoning
of the Property could cause any material harm to anyone or anything.
Dr. Baker pointed out that neighboring property owners won't be harmed by the
Proposed Amendment, as there would be more distance between the new home and the
next nearest home than the spacing between existing homes on the street:
Every other home along our street on just our side of the street that has most all of
the homes going down to the Marc are separated by 25 feet. Okay? And, so that's,
they're not harming each other, okay? But a home on this new lot, it would be
125' from the neighbor, is going to harm them? ... So basically, I don't understand
why all the other homes along Little Kate have a house on either side 25' apart and
these homes aren't harmed?
(R, 38.)
Neither does the Record contain evidence that the Proposed Amendment would
cause material injury to "the public". One member of the Planning Commission factored
his recollection of "public opinion" of citizens who commented and contributed to the
process of amending the General Plan that sub-division within existing, developed
subdivisions is disfavored. (R. 95, 117.) Another Commissioner rebutted that the City
remained "neutral." Id. Regardless of the Planning Commission's recollection of general
public sentiment on re-subdividing, there is no evidence in the Record of public injury
21

Themes from the letters in opposition focus on misunderstanding that the Proposed
Amendment would not comply with zoning regulations and unsupported concerns that
the addition of another structure might impact wildlife.
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resulting from the Proposed Amendment. To the contrary, the Planning Commission and
Council specifically found that there "are no significant fiscal or environmental impacts
from this application." (R. 17, at ,r 63.) Again, it is simply impossible, and not even
reasonably debatable, that one additional single family home in this neighborhood,
however it is defined, that is fully compliant with the zoning of the property could cause
any material harm to anyone or anything.
Accordingly, the Conclusion that the Proposed Amendment would cause material
injury to the public is not supported by the Record and is arbitrary and capricious and
cannot amount to a legitimate basis for the denial of the Proposed Amendment.

c. "Approval of the plat amendment does adversely affect health, safety
and welfare of the citizens of Park City." (R. 123, at ,r 3.)
Just as there is no evidence in the Record of "material injury to the public," there
is no evidence in the Record that the Proposed Amendment would "adversely affect
health, safety and welfare of the citizens of Park City." The Record is devoid of any
consideration by the Planning Commission or City Council of the "health, safety and
welfare" of the "citizens", other than that the Proposed Amendment satisfies all zoning
regulations which are generally designed to protect the health, safety and welfare of the
public. It is not even reasonably debatable that one additional single family home in this
"neighborhood", however it is defined, that is fully compliant with the zoning of the
Property could adversely affect the health, safety or welfare of the citizens of Park City.
Accordingly, the finding that the Proposed Amendment adversely affects the health,
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~

safety and welfare of the citizens of Park City is arbitrary and capricious and cannot form
a legitimate basis for the denial of the Proposed Amendment.

i. The potential for undefined "aesthetic harm" resulting from a
perceived "incompatibility with the direct neighborhood" is not
a concern for the public welfare justifying denial of a codecompliant land use application under Park City's police power.
MLUDMA defines that land use may be regulated to "provide for the health, safety
and welfare" of the community generally referred to as a government's "police powers."
Utah Code Ann.§ 10-9a-102 {l); see also Utah Code Ann.§ 10-8-84 {"The municipal
legislative body may pass all ordinances and rules, and make all regulations, not repugnant
to law, necessary for carrying into effect or discharging all powers and duties ... as are
necessity and proper to provide for the safety and preserve the health ...") MLUDMA
goes on to identify additional purposes, including: to "promote the prosperity ... and
aesthetics of each municipality ... to protect both urban and nonurban development ... to
provide fundamental fairness in land use regulation, and to protect property values." Utah
Code Ann. § 10-9a-102 (1).
There is no dispute that Park City is granted police powers to regulate land use in a
manner that protects the health, safety and welfare of its citizens. Park City alleges that in
denying the Proposed Amendment, it was protecting the health, safety and welfare of its
community, specifically by protecting against potential "aesthetic harm." There is no Utah
case law supporting application of the police power to restrict use of private property
without clear identification of paramount concerns of public health, safety or welfare. The
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~

~

well-established majority view in the United States is that aesthetic concerns raised by
potential uses of private property- without threat to health, safety and welfare- are
~

insufficient to exercise the police power. See Mayor and City Council ofBaltimore v. Mano

Swartz, Inc., 299 A.2d 828, 832 (MD 1973) ("The Ordinance had as its sole purpose the
achievement of an aesthetically pleasing result, and we have held this not to be a
permissible use of the police power. While aesthetic goals may legitimately serve as an
additional legislative purpose, if health, morals or safety or other ends generally associated
with the concept of public welfare are being served, they cannot be the only purpose of
regulation.")2 2 ; State v. Whitlock, 63 S.E. 123, 124 (NC 1908) ("Aesthetic considerations are
a matter of luxury and indulgence, rather than of necessity, and it is necessity alone which
justifies the exercise of the police power to take private property without compensation");

Peebles v. State, 25 Ohio Law Abs. 545 (Ohio App. 7 Dist. 1937)("aesthetic reasons alone,
unrelated to the requirements of the public health, morals, safety or welfare, will not justify
the exercise of the police power."); Haller Sign Works v. Physical Culture Training School,

®

94 N.E. 920, 923 (Ill. 1911) ("[T]he statute in question is an attempt to exercise the police
power purely from aesthetic considerations, disassociated entirely from any relation to the
public health, morals, comfort, or general welfare. . . The courts of this country have with

22

~

The court further distinguished between regulations preserving or protecting
aesthetically pleasing structures, such as historical or architecturally significant buildings,
from regulations designed to force community preferences or tastes upon individual
property owners and thereby preclude otherwise lawful use of private property. Id. at
835.
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great unanimity held that the police power cannot interfere with private property rights for
purely aesthetic purposes.").
The Bakers concede that in extreme cases, true "aesthetic harm" may trigger public
welfare concerns and provide for appropriate exercise of police powers. For example, in
Members of City Council of City ofLos Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789

(1989) the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that police powers could be used to
regulate aesthetic harm, in that case "the visual assault on the citizens of Los Angeles
presented by an accumulation of signs posted on public property'' which was so extreme
that the Court determined it was a "significant substantive evil" which was "diminishing the
quality of urban life." Id. at 807. However, there is no legal authority supporting the
argument that inconsequential aesthetic deviations, for which there is no threatened negative
impact on public health, safety or welfare (de minimis non curat lex), are properly regulated
through police powers.
ii. There is no threatened aesthetic harm from the Bakers' Proposed
Amendment.

Even if Park City could exercise its police powers to avoid "aesthetic harm"
unaccompanied by the threat of public health, safety or welfare - which the Bakers dispute
- there is no threatened "aesthetic harm" that would be suffered by approval of the Proposed
Amendment. The Proposed Amendment would result in dividing the Bakers' unusually
wide lot into two lots. (R. 16, at ,r,r 44-47). The Bakers' lot already appears from the street
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~

4,

- the viewpoint of the public23 -to consist of two lots; one lot occupied by the Bakers'
existing home, and what looks like an adjoining "empty" lot. (R. 117.) Park City has

(;j

admitted that the width of the two lots would be compatible with lots in the surrounding
area. (R. 70.) Park City also found that, by reviewing structure separation (the spacing
between housing), the two lots created by the Proposed Amendment would also be, and

~

therefore appear, compatible with the surrounding neighborhood. (R. 39.)
As such, to the public and from a street level view, the Proposed Amendment would
(j

appear visually consistent. Lot depth and overall lot size- the factors which Park City's
finding of alleged incompatibility is based- are not visually discernible from passer-bys at a
street level view, and, therefore, would not create "aesthetic harm." The Proposed
Amendment does not pose a threat of a readily apparent "aesthetic" discrepancy within the
"direct neighborhood."
Even if there were a visually discernible distinction between the perceived lot
dimensions/ sizes of the two lots created by the Proposed Amendment and neighboring

~

properties, there still is no definable "hann." See Black's Law Dictionary (Third Pocket Ed.
2006) (defining harm as "injury, loss, damage; material or tangible detriment.")

23

"People judge compatibility by what they see walking or driving by." (R. 114,
Commissioner Campbell).
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iii. Any minimal "aesthetic harm" is outweighed in the balance by the
"landowner's private property interests" and the denial violates
"fundamental fairness in land use regulation".

Even if there is any ''aesthetic harm" (to, apparently, birds) by building a fully
compliant home on what appears to be an "empty lot" that trivial harm cannot outweigh the
"landowner's private property interests" as protected by MLUDMA in Section 10-9a-102(2)
and Article I, Section 22 of the Constitution of the State of Utah. Further, there is no
"fundamental fairness" as required by Section 10-9a-102(1) in allowing such a meretricious
decision to stand.
While there is no Utah case of which the Bakers are aware directly construing how a
court should "balance" the rights between a governmental regulation of the aesthetics of
land use and the private property owner's rights to develop their land or what constitutes
''fundamental fairness in land use regulation" this case seems to be well beyond any tipping
point. Those statutory phrases protecting private property rights are not just mere hortatory
window dressing to be ignored any more than the similarly vague phrases that the City
relies upon in the "Purposes" section of MLUDMA.
Utah appellate courts have long recognized the almost sacred nature of the right to
use private property. For example in both, inter alia, Brown v Sandy City Board of
Adjustment, 957 P.2d 207, 210 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) and Patterson v Utah County Board of
Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 607 (Utah Ct. App 1995) when considering ambiguities in

zoning codes, the Court of Appeals held: "because zoning ordinances are in derogation of a
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property owner's common-law right to unrestricted use of his or her property, provisions
therein restricting property uses should be strictly construed, and provisions permitting
G:iJ

property uses should be liberally construed in favor of the property owner."
If ambiguities in land use regulations are construed against government then, surely,

something as evanescent and utterly subjective as the aesthetic arguments advanced by Park
City here, no matter how much procedural gobbledy-gook Park City tried to dress them up
with, cannot outweigh the rights of the Bakers and deny them fundamental fairness. After
all, as the Greek proverbs first put to paper in 3rd century BCE proverbs, beauty is in the eye
of the beholder. And it is fundamentally unfair to allow such unfettered discretion based on
imagined and paranoid harms from NIMBY' s to destroy the property rights of the Bakers.
If Park City has absolute discretion to deny the Proposed Amendment based on the

phantasm of aesthetic harm demonstrated on the Record here, then there is nothing to
prevent the City from, tomorrow, permitting the same lot split for, say a friend of the Mayor
or a City Council member. There have to be some non-arbitrary/discretionary standards for
~

a subdivision amendment. If there are no such standards then how can anyone "balance"
anything at all and that would violate "fundamental fairness"?

~
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d. "There is Good Cause to deny the proposed plat amendment as the plat
does cause undo [sic] harm to adjacent property owners because the
proposal is not compatible with existing Single Family development
(lots) in the near proximity." (R. 123, at 14.)

The final Conclusion of Law, which compiles the previous Conclusions as the
basis of Good Cause to deny the Proposed Amendment, is not supported by substantial
evidence in the Record.
First, as discussed in Section IA, there is no evidence of "undue harm to adjacent
property owners." Second, as discussed in Section lB, while "compatibil[ity] with
existing Single Family development (lots) in the near proximity" is an arbitrary and
irrelevant standard invented at the misdirection of the Planning Commission staff, there is
not any real evidence in the Record to support a finding that the Proposed Amendment
would be "incompatible" with development in the "near proximity." Last, as discussed
below, Park City did not apply the standard of Good Cause correctly.

III.

Park City's decision was illegal when it applied the wrong standard of
review of Good Cause to the Bakers' Proposed Amendment.

Park City applied the wrong standard of review to the Proposed Amendment when
it created out of thin air its own amorphous standard of Good Cause24 and ignored the

~

24

The LMC defines "Good Cause" as "providing positive benefits and mitigating
negative impacts, determined on a case by case basis to include things such as: providing
public amenities and benefits, resolving existing issues and non-conformities, addressing
issues related to density, promoting excellent and sustainable design, utilizing best
planning and design practices, preserving the character of the neighborhood and of Park
City and furthering the health, safety and welfare of the Park City community." LMC §
15-15-14. 1.112.; i.e., whatever the City can later use to justify a whimsical decision.
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presumption of approval under State law. MLUDMA's directive that a plat amendment
shall be granted when Good Cause exists is the codification of long established Utah law.
~

See Utah Code Ann.§ 10-9a-609. MLUDMA does not specifically define Good Cause.

However, more than thirty years ago the Utah Supreme Court held that a property owner
is ''entitled ... to a subdivision approval if his proposed development meets the zoning
requirements in existence at the time of his application and if he proceeds with reasonable
diligence, absent a compelling, countervailing public interest." Western Land Equities,
<;j

Inc. v. City ofLogan, 617 P.2d 388,396 (Utah 1980); see Patterson v. American Fork
City, 2003 UT 7, 126 (Utah 2003) (recognizing "the developer was entitled to approval

of the subdivision plan if it was in compliance with zoning requirements in existence at
the time of the application.").
While the Court recognized that "compelling public interests may, when
appropriate, be given priority over individual economic interests" a city must provide
sufficient reason to overcome the presumption that a subdivision which satisfies zoning
~

requirements should be approved." Western Land Equities, Inc., 617 P.2d at 396 (finding
the reasons given by the city for withholding approval of the proposed subdivision were
not compelling when the potential negative impacts could be negated through
modifications or which negative impacts would be present if the property were put to an
alternate, permitted use). "An applicant for approval of a planned and permitted use

57
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should not be subject to shifting policies that do not reflect serious public concerns."

Jd_2s
Without a presumption that zoning-compliant applications are to be approved,
landowners are at the mercy of "shifting" land use standards (such as Park City just
conjuring up its "neighborhood= subdivision= 'existing Development' formulation= no
'good cause"'= denial= essential unchallengability"). The inequity and confusion that
would result from allowing a municipality to apply an inconsistent and ill-defined
standard to each application is illustrated by the conversation between the characters
Alice and Humpty Dumpty in the Lewis Carroll's Through the Looking Glass2 6 :
'I don't know what you mean by "glory",' Alice said.
~

Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. 'Of course you don't-till I tell you.
I meant "there's a nice knock-down argument for you!"'
'But "glory" doesn't mean "a nice knock-down argument",' Alice objected.
'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, 'it means
just what I choose it to mean - neither more nor less.'
'The question is,' said Alice, 'whether you can make words mean so many
different things.'
'The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be master-that's all.'

25

"Ordinances passed by municipalities are generally valid unless they are inconsistent
with state law." Salt Lake City v. Newman, 2005 UT App 191, ,r 11 (an ordinance is in
conflict with state law if it forbids that which is permitted under state law); Utah Code.
Ann§ 10-8-84. That is the case here.
26

http:!/en. wikipedia.org/wiki/Humpty_ Dumpty
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i)

The presumption of approval absent "clear and compelling public interest" is
inconsistent with, and contrary to, the LMC's "shifting" definition of Good Cause. The
~

Proposed Amendment satisfies the requirements for approval under State law. It is
undisputed that the Proposed Amendment is compliant with applicable zoning regulations
in the LMC. There is no evidence or finding in the Record of a "clear and compelling

public interest" which would justify denial of the Proposed Amendment. Accordingly,
Park City's denial of the Proposed Amendment based on its invented interpretation of the
~

LMC's definition of Good Cause is contrary to, and inconsistent with, State law, and is
therefore illegal.
IV.

Even if Park City is permitted to apply the LMC's Good Cause standard,
it failed to properly do so.

The Record does not support a finding that Park City correctly applied the LMC's
standard of Good Cause in denying the Proposed Amendment. The Commission was
concerned with approving the Proposed Amendment due to the fear of encouraging other
subdivision applications and was advised by counsel that a "defensible" denial of the
Proposed Amendment would be based on lack of "compatibility." (R. 91.) This desire is
presumably the basis for the Planning staff's creation of incredibly narrow and arbitrary
standard of "compatibility" within the "direct neighborhood" (only single family
residences on the same side of the street and, actually, only within HRS itself) rather than
considering factors of the LMC's Good Cause balancing test. This is not the standard
imposed by the LMC or to other applications similarly situated.
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Admittedly, three of the Commissioner's expressly referenced Good Cause as a
basis for their decision but none of them, however, provided any analysis of the balancing
test or multiple considerations upon which any conclusion had to have been based. 27
Considering that the Planning Commission found "no significant fiscal or
environmental impacts" from the Proposed Amendment, there is no evidentiary basis for
"negative impacts" which could be the basis for a finding that Good Cause does not exist.
The Proposed Amendment does not create an "issue related to density," as the Proposed
Amendment satisfies the density regulations of the SF District (1/3 acre lots). (R. 15, at il
20.) Further, the Planning Commission's consideration of a general public attitude
against increased density is contrary "to case-by-case" analysis required under the Good
Cause standard. (R. 93-94.) There is no evidence of impacts to the "health, safety or
welfare" of the citizens of Park City, or material injury to the public or adjacent
neighbors. See Argument, Sections lB, lC.
Further, the Record contains evidence of "positive benefits" in support of a finding
of Good Cause for the Proposed Amendment. Clearly, the Bakers would receive
economic value from the creation of another lot upon which a home could be built. (R.
117.) Park City and its citizens would benefit from the additional tax revenue resulting
from the creation of the additional lot and home. (R. 115.) While Park City would
27

One Commissioner provided no analysis at all, another found that economic benefit to
the Bakers was not sufficient Good Cause and the last found Good Cause lacking based
on the "incompatible with direct neighborhood" analysis (noting that he while he
considered negative impacts on direct neighbors, that concern was offset). (R. 116-118.)
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Gj

collect additional tax revenues, the addition of one new home would be serviced by
existing infrastructure without creating additional costs· or impacts. (R. 93) (density is
4:Jl

not bad if it is an "infill project" that will "use existing infrastructure.") The creation of
another moderately sized home (2700 sq. ft) could be considered adding "affordable
housing" to the area. (R. 90, 94.) The location of the Property contributes to the New
Lot being "walkable" development. (R. 89.) Being able to construct the new home will
benefit the Bakers because they can build an energy efficient retirement.home (without

~

stairs). (R. 90.) The Proposed Amendment would appear visually consistent with
neighboring homes (except from the vantage point of a bird or a drone) because it would
"support the same distances between houses .... " (R. 89.) While the Bakers provided
Park City with additional arguments concerning how the Proposed Amendment would
benefit the community, the Record includes only a vague reference. (R. 95) ("Dr. Baker
cited all the reasons why it benefits the community.")
In sum, while the Bakers dispute that application of the LMC's Good Cause

~

analysis was proper, Park City failed to even correctly apply the standard. Park City did
not properly weigh potential benefits against negative impacts as directed by the LMC.
Instead, the Planning Commission staff invented a standard of "compatibility," of lot
depth and size, with the "direct neighborhood," specifically only single family residences
on the same side of the street, as a purported basis to deny the Proposed Amendment.
There is no finding as to how the alleged inconsistency could cause harm to neighbors or
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the public which would override the potential positive benefits and presumption that a

liii

property owner should be permitted to make use of his property in a manner which is
consistent with zoning regulations. As such, the decision was illegal.

~

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Bakers respectfully request the Court reverse the
District Court's order and ruling granting summary judgment in favor of Park City, and
remand to the District Court with instructions to order the Park City Council to approve
the Proposed Amendment.

ADDENDA
Attached hereto as an addenda are: (A) Order Granting Summary Judgment to
Defendant and Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment; (B) UTAH CODE
ANN.§ 10-9a-801; (C) UTAH CODE ANN:§ 10-9a- 609 (I); (D) Park City Land

Management Code§ 15-2.11-3; (E) Park City Land Management Code§ 15-7.1-1 et seq.

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH
UTAH RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 24{0{1}
This brief complies with the type-volume requirements of Utah Rule of Civil
- Procedure 24(f)(l.) This brief contains 13, 981 words. 28

28

As calculated by the word processing system pursuant to UTAH R. APP. P 24(f)(l)(C.)
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following this _[l_ day of March, 2016 by:
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile
[X] Depositing the same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid

[ ] Federal Express

[ ] Certified Mail, Receipt No. ___, return receipt requested

Mark Harrington
Polly Samuels McLean
Park City Attorney's Office
445 Marsac Ave.
PO Box 1480
Park City, UT 84060
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DATED this /i!:_ day of March, 2016.

Bruce R. Baird
Attorney for Bakers

~
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Order Granting Summary Judgment to Defendant and
Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment

(i)
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The Order of Court is stated below:
~ - ·\ \
Dated: October 28, 2015
Isl Kara ttj r.
· j•

12:35:49 AM

Distric }'-:••,..r.:,;.~~ §
~,~~

Gi)

Mark D. Harrington (#6562)
Polly Samuels McLean (#8922)
445 Marsac Avenue
Park City, Utah 84060
Telephone: (435) 615-5025
Fax: (435) 615-4916
pmclean@parkcity.org
Attorneys for Defendant
~

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MICHAEL E. BAKER and KATHLEEN M.
. PAPI-BAKER, trustees under the MICHAEL
AND KATH LEEN BAKER FAMILY
LIVING TRUST DATED MARCH 25, 2005,
Plaintiffs,
V.

PARK CITY MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION, a Utah municipal
corporation,

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT
AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Civil No. 140500532
Judge Kara Petit

Defendant.

Having considered the Plaintiffs~ Motion for Summary Judgment and the
Defendanfs Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and based upon: the record submitted
by the Defendant; the pleadings and memoranda filed by the parties; and the arguments
presented at the September 18, 2015. and October 2, 2015, hearings before the Honorable
Kara Pettit, this Court hereby finds and concludes as follows:
1.

The Defendant has compiled and transmitted the record for this matter, as
1
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required by Utah Code Ann. (UCA) § 10-9a-801 (7)(a), and the case may be decided on
the record in accordance with UCA § I 0-9a-80 I (8)(a).

2.

The denial by the Park City Council ("'Council") on September 4, 2014, of

the Plaintiffs' application to amend the Holiday Ranchettes Subdivision plat was a
legislative act because, pursuant to the ha1lmarks of legislative action identified by the
Utah Supreme Court in Suarez v. Grand County, 20 l 2 UT 72, the decision is ·'at least
arguably legislative," and this Court must therefore "give controlling significance to the
form of the underlying governmental decision." (Suarez at~ 4 I (quoting Carter v. Lehi

City, 2012 UT 2 at~ 75)). The form of the City's underlying decision is legislative, as
evidenced by: (I) the City's characterization of its action; (2) the substance of the
decision; and (3) the formal process followed by the City, which is the same formal
process found in the Grand County decision that was at issue in Suarez.
3.

The Council's denial of the Plaintiffs' application is presumed valid under

UCA § I 0-9a-80 I (3)(a)(i), and this Court concludes that the denial of Plaintiffs'
application is a valid exercise under UCA § 10-9a-801(3)(a)(ii) of the Council's land-use
authority and is not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.
4.

The Council's denial of the Plaintiffs' application was not illegal. UCA §

I 0-9a-609( I) says that a plat may be amended if there is good cause and if no public
street, easement, or right of way is thereby vacated or amended. The term "good cause" is

~

not defined in Title I 0, Chapter 9a of the Utah Code. The Park City Land Managemen_t
Code (LMC) does define "'good cause," and that definition is not in conflict with the Utah
Code. Under UCA § I 0-9a-l 04( I), a municipality can impose '"stricter requirements or
2
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higher standards" than those imposed hy Title 10, Chapter 9a of the (Jtah Code. The

LMC does not conflict with State law, and the Council's denial of the Plaintiffs'

41'

application docs not violate any law, statute, or ordinance then in effect.
Decisions of land use authorities bear a "strong presumption of validity."

5.

(Patterson v. Utah County Bd. ofAdjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah App. 1995)
(quoting Thurston v. Cache County, 626 P.2d 440,445 (Utah 1981)).The court may not
substitute its own judgment on matters of public policy for that of the land use authority;
the court's role is to simply ensure that the local land use authority proceeds "within the
limits of fairness and justice and acts in good faith to achieve permissible ends."

(Patterson, at 604).

6.

Because the decision was legislative in nature, the court will overturn the

Council's decision only if it is not reasonably debatable, meaning that there is "no
reasonable basis" for the decision or that the decision is "wholly discordant to reason and
justice." (See Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 2003 UT 16, ii 14 (citing Walker v. Brigham

City, 856 P.2d 347, 349 (Utah 1993) and Dowse v. Salt Lake City Corp., 255 P.2d 723,
724 (Utah 1953)). By this standard, based on at least the evidence in pages 140002-03,
11, 27-31, 41, 43, 52-54, 75, 82, 91-92, 96, and 111-113 of the record, it is reasonably
debatable that the Plaintiffs' application did not show good cause for the plat amendment,
pursuant to UCA § I 0-9a-609( I). Furthermore, in reference to the Council's asserted

conclusions of law, it is reasonably debatable that:
a. ··The proposed plat amendment is not consistent with the Park City Land
Management Code and applicable State Law regarding lot combinations."

3
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b. ''The public will be materially injured by the proposed plat amendment as the
proposed plat amendment is not compatible with the direct neighborhood in tenns of
lot size and depth."
c. "Approval of the plat amendment does adversely affect health, safety, and
welfare of the citizens of Park City."
d. "There is Good Cause to deny the proposed plat amendment as the plat does
cause und[ ue] hann on adjacent property owners because the proposal is not
compatible with existing Single Family development (lots) in the near proximity."
7.

In the alternative, even if the Council's denial of the Plaintiffs' application

were an administrative decision and therefore reviewed under a "substantial evidence"
standard, based on at least the evidence in pages 140002-03, 36, 41-44, 52-53, 56-58, 66.
75, 91, 96, 99, and 111-113 of the record, there is substantial evidence in the record in
support of the conclusion that the Plaintiffs' application did not demonstrate good cause
pursuant to UCA § I 0-9a-609( 1). Therefore, the Council~ s denial of the Plaintiffs'
application for plat amendment is supported by substantial evidence in the record.
8.

The record shows substantial evidence in support of Council's conclusion

that, "The proposed plat amendment is not consistent with the Park City Land
Management Code and applicable State Law regarding Jot combinations."

9.

The record shows substantial evidence in support of the Council's

conclusion that, "There is Good Cause to deny the proposed plat amendment as the plat
does cause und[ue] harm on adjacent property owners because the proposal is not
compatible with existing Single Family development (lots) in the near proximity."
4
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10.

The record shows substantial evidenc.e in support of the Council's

conclusion that, "'Approval of the plat amendment does adversely affect health, safety,
and welfare of the citizens or Park City.~' Pursuant to Naylor v. Salt Lake City C01p., 410
P.2d 764 (Utah 1966) and Patterson v. Utah County Bd. ofAdjustment, 893 P.2d 602
(Utah App. 1995) (quoting Naylor), the proper exercise of zoning power promotes the
gtmeral health, safety, and welfare. The substantial evidence in the record showing that
the Plaintiffs• proposed plat amendment was not compatible with existing developments
and would therefore detract from the orderly development of the City as a whole supports
the Council's finding regarding the general health, safety, and welfare of the City.
11.

The record does not show substantial evidence in support of the Council's

conclusion that, "'The public will be materially injured by the proposed plat amendment
as the proposed plat amendment is not compatible with the direct neighborhood in terms

of lot size and depth." However, the court need not ratify all of the Council's conclusions
of law in order to find that the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record;
it is enough that there is substantia] evidence in support of the Council's determination
that the application did not demonstrate good cause pursuant to UCA § 10-9a-609( 1).

12.

The '"reasonably debatable" and ''substantial evidence" standards of

review cstabl ished hy l Jtah Supreme Court case law and UCA § 10-9a-80 I ensure
fundamental fairness in municipal land use decisions by determining whether a decision
is arbitrary or capricious. lJCA § 10-9a-102(2) dot:s not require any separate balancing

test by the courts.
Based upon the foregoing and the ruling made from the bench on October 2, 2015, it
5
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is hereby ORDERED:

I.

Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is granted;

2.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied;

3.

Each part is to bear their own costs and fees; and

4.

This order constitutes a final judgment according to Rule 54 of the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure.

END OF ORDER
(Note: The Court's signature is at the top of this document, as per Utah R. Civ. P. JO(e).)

Approved as to form:

Isl Bruce Baird
Bruce R. Baird
Attorney for Plaintiffs

6
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ADDENDUMB
§ 10-9a-801. No district court review until administrative remedies exhausted-Time
for ftling--Tolling of time--Standards governing court review--Record on review-Staying of decision

(1) No person may challenge in district court a municipality's land use decision made
under this chapter, or under a regulation made under authority of this chapter, until that
person has exhausted the person's administrative remedies as provided in Part 7, Appeal
Authority and Variances, if applicable.
(2)(a) Any person adversely affected by a final decision made in the exercise of or in
violation of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the decision
with the district court within 30 days after the local land use decision is final.
(b)(i) The time under Subsection (2)(a) to file a petition is tolled from the date a property
owner files a request for arbitration of a constitutional taking issue with the property
rights ombudsman under Section 13-43-204 until 30 days after:
(A) the arbitrator issues a final award; or
(B) the property rights ombudsman issues a written statement under Subsection 13-43204(3)(b) declining to arbitrate or to appoint an arbitrator.
(ii) A tolling under Subsection (2)(b)(i) operates only as to the specific constitutional
taking issue that is the subject of the request for arbitration filed with the property rights
ombudsman by a property owner.
(iii) A request for arbitration filed with the property rights ombudsman after the time
under Subsection (2)(a) to file a petition has expired does not affect the time to file a
petition.
(3)(a) The courts shall:
(i) presume that a decision, ordinance, or regulation made under the authority of this
chapter is valid; and
(ii) determine only whether or not the decision, ordinance, or regulation is arbitrary,
capricious, or illegal.
(b) A decision, ordinance, or regulation involving the exercise of legislative discretion is
valid if it is reasonably debatable that the decision, ordinance, or regulation promotes the
purposes of this chapter and is not otherwise illegal.
(c) A final decision of a land use authority or an appeal authority is valid if the decision is
supported by substantial evidence in the record and is not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.
(d) A determination of illegality requires a determination that the decision, ordinance, or
regulation violates a law, statute, or ordinance in effect at the time the decision was made
or the ordinance or regulation adopted.
(4) The provisions of Subsection (2)(a) apply from the date on which the municipality
takes final action on a land use application for any adversely affected third party, if the
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municipality conformed with the notice provisions of Part 2, Notice, or for any person
who had actual notice of the pending decision.
(5) If the municipality has complied with Section 10-9a-205, a challenge to the enactment
of a land use ordinance or general plan may not be filed with the district court more than
3 0 days after the enactment.
(6) The petition is barred unless it is filed within 30 days after the appeal authority's
decision is final.
(7)(a) The land use authority or appeal authority, as the case may be, shall transmit to the
reviewing court the record of its proceedings, including its minutes, findings, orders, and,
if available, a true and correct transcript of its proceedings.
(b) If the proceeding was tape recorded, a transcript of that tape recording is a true and
correct transcript for purposes of this Subsection (7).
(8)(a)(i) If there is a record, the district court's review is limited to the record provided by
the land use authority or appeal authority, as the case may be.
(ii) The court may not accept or consider any evidence outside the record of the land use
authority or appeal authority, as the case may be, unless that evidence was offered to the
land use authority or appeal authority, respectively, and the court determines that it was
improperly excluded.
(b) If there is no record, the court may call witnesses and take evidence.
(9)(a) The filing of a petition does not stay the decision of the land use authority or
authority appeal authority, as the case may be.
(b)(i) Before filing a petition under this section or a request for mediation or arbitration of
a constitutional taking issue under Section 13-43-204, the aggrieved party may petition
the appeal authority to stay its decision.
(ii) Upon receipt of a petition to stay, the appeal authority may order its decision stayed
pending district court review if the appeal authority finds it to be in the best interest of the
municipality.
(iii) After a petition is filed under this section or a request for' mediation or arbitration of
a constitutional taking issue is filed under Section 13-43-204, the petitioner may seek an
injunction staying the appeal authority's decision.
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ADDENDUMC
§ 10-9a-609. Land use authority approval of vacation or amendment of plat--

Recording the amended plat

~

41

(1) The land use authority may approve the vacation or amendment of a plat by signing
an amended plat showing the vacation or amendment if the land use authority finds that:
(a) there is good cause for the vacation or amendment; and
(b) no public street, right-of-way, or easement has been vacated or amended.
(2)(a) The land use authority shall ensure that the amended plat showing the vacation or
amendment is recorded in the office of the county recorder in which the land is located.
(b) If the amended plat is approved and recorded in accordance with this section, the
recorded plat shall vacate, supersede, and replace any contrary provision in a previously
recorded plat of the same land.
(3)(a) A legislative body may vacate a subdivision or a portion of a subdivision by
recording in the county recorder's office an ordinance describing the subdivision or the
portion being vacated.
(b) The recorded vacating ordinance shall replace a previously recorded plat described in
the vacating ordinance.
(4) An amended plat may not be submitted to the county recorder for recording unless it
1s:
(a) signed by the land use authority; and
(b) signed, acknowledged, and dedicated by each owner of record of the portion of the
plat that is amended.
(5) A management committee may sign and dedicate an amended plat as provided in Title
57, Chapter 8, Condominium Ownership Act.
(6) A plat may be corrected as provided in Section 57-3-106.
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Park City Land Management Code § 15-2.11-3.

Lot and Site Requirements within the SF Zone include the following: "The
maximum Density for Subdivisions is three (3) units per acre"; "The
minimum Front Yard is twenty feet. New Front Facing Garages for Single
Family and Duplex Dwellings must be at least twenty-five feet from the
Front Lot Line"; "The minimum Rear Yard is fifteen feet"; "The minimum
Side Yard is twelve feet."

~

"'
~
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ADDENDUME

Park City Land Management Code § 15-7.1-1 et seq.

. e

(j)
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TITL E 15 - LAND MANAGEMENT CODE <LMC)
CHAPTER 7.1 - SUBDMSION PROCEDURES

Chapter adopted by Ordinance No. 01-17
CHAPTER 7.1 - SUBDIVISION
PROCEDURES.
15-7.1-1.

JURISDICTION.

These Subdivision regulations shall apply to
all Subdivisions or Re-subdivisions of land,
and to Lot Line Adjustments, as defined
herein, located within the corporate limits of
Park City.
Whenever any Subdivision of land is
proposed, before any contract is made for
the sale of any part thereof, and before any
permit for the erection of a Structure in such
proposed Subdivision shall be granted, the
subdividing Owner, or his authorized Agent,
shall apply for and secure approval of such
proposed Subdivision in accordance with the
following procedure.

15-7.1-2.

PROCEDURE.

No land shall be subdivided within the
corporate limits of Park City until:

Application for Subdivision to the Planning
Commission through the Park City Planning
Department;
(B)
The Planning Commission holds a
public hearing and makes a final
recommendation to the City Council; and
(C)
Approval of the Subdivision is
obtained by the Planning Commission and
City Council, or approval by the Planning
Director under proper authority; and
(D)
The approved Subdivision Plat is
filed with the County Recorder.

(Amended by Ord No. 06-22)
15-7.1-3.
CLASSIFICATION OF
SUBDIVISIONS.
(A)
SUBDIVISION. At its discretion,
the Planning Commission may waive one or
more of the steps in the approval process by
allowing the Applicant and/or Developer to
combine the requirements of the Preliminary
Plat and final Subdivision Plat into a single
submittal.

(A)
The Owner, Applicant and/or
Developer or his\her Agent submit an
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(1)
MINOR SUBDIVISION. A
Subdivision containing not more
than three (3)Lots fronting on an
existing Street, not involving any
new Street or road, or the extension
of municipal facilities, or the
creation of public improvements.

(1)
FINAL PLAT. A Final Plat
shall be approved in accordance with
these regulations.
(C)

RECORD OF SURVEY.
(1)
FINAL PLAT. A Final Plat
shall be approved in accordance with
these regulations.

Final Plat. A Final
(a)
Plat shall be approved in
accordance with these
regulations.

LOT LINE ADJUSTMENT. The
relocation of the Property boundary line
between two adjoining Lots.
(D)

MAJOR SUBDMSION. A
Subdivision of land into four (4) or
more Lots, or any size Subdivision
requiring any new Street.
(2)

FINAL PLAT. A Final Plat
shall be approved in accordance with
these regulations.
(1)

Preliminary Plat. A
Preliminary Plat may be
approved in accordance with
these regulations.

~

15-7.1-4.

(a)

OFFICIAL SUBMISSION
DATES. At its discretion, the Planning
Commission may waive one or more of the
steps in the approval process by allowing the
Applicant and Developer to combine the
requirements of both preliminary and final
Subdivision Plats into a single submittal.
For the purpose of these regulations, for
both major and minor Subdivisions, the date
of the regular meetings of the Planning
Commission at which the public hearings on
final approval of the Subdivision Plat,
including any adjourned date thereof, is
closed, shall constitute the official submittal
date of the plat at which the statutory period
required for formal approval or disapproval
of the plat shall commence to run.
(A)

(b)
Final Plat. A Final
Plat shall be approved in
accordance with these
regulations.

GP

Vjp

GENERAL PROCEDURE.

PLAT AMENDMENT. The
combining of existing subdivided Lots into
one or more Lots or the amendment of plat
notes or other platted elements including but
not limited to eae:;ements, limit<; of
disturbance boundaries or areas, building
pads, and house size limitations. Plat
Amendments shall be reviewed according to
the requirements of Section 15-7.1-6 Final
Subdivision Plat and approval shall require a
finding of Good Cause.
(B)

(B)
PHASING PLAN REQUIRED.
All residential Subdivisions with more than
twenty (20) Lots or Condominiums shall
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conditions, inclement weather or
other factors.

include a phasing plan, which specifies the
timing of public improvements and
residential construction.

(C)
COORDINATION OF
MULTIPLE APPLICATIONS. It is the
intent of these regulations that Subdivision
review be carried out simultaneously with
the review of Master Planned
Developments. Required Applications shall
be submitted in a form to satisfy both the
requirements of the Subdivision regulations
and Master Planned Development provisions
of the Land Management Code. Any project
falling within the Sensitive Lands Area
Overlay Zone may be subject to additional
requirements and regulations as outlined in
the Sensitive Area Overlay Zone
Regulations.

(I)
PHASING PLAN
REQUIREMENTS. A phasing
plan shall include:
(a)
The number of units
or Parcels to be developed in
each phase and the timing of
each phase.
(b)
The timing of
construction of public
improvements and
Subdivision amenities to
serve each phase.

15-7.1-5.
PRELIMINARY
SUBDIVISION PLAT.

(c)
The relationship
between the public
improvements in the current
Subdivision and contiguous
land previously subdivided
and yet to be subdivided.

(A)
PREAPPLICATION
REQUIREMENTS. Before preparing the
Preliminary Plat for a Subdivision, the
Applicant should arrange for a preApplication conference with the Planning
Department to discuss the procedure for
approval of a Subdivision Plat and the
requirements as to general layout of Streets
and for reservations of land, Street
improvements, drainage, sewerage, fire
protection, mitigation of environmental
impacts as determined, and similar matters,
as well as the availability of existing
services. The Planning Department shall
also advise the Applicant, where
appropriate, to discuss the proposed
Subdivision with those agencies who must
eventually approve those aspects of the
Subdivision coming within their

(2)
MASTER PLANNED
DEVELOPMENT. If the
Subdivision is in an Area covered by
an approved Master Planned
Development, which has a phasing
plan, the phasing plan for the
Subdivision shall be consistent with
the phasing plan for the Master
Planned Development.
REVISIONS. An Applicant
(3)
may request a revision of the phasing
plan, which may be necessary due to
such conditions as changing market
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jurisdiction; such as, the Snyderville Basin
Sewer Improvement District, the Park City
Fire Service District, the Park City School
District, and the various utility service
providers.

~

contract of sale was executed, and, if
any corporations are involved, a copy
of the resolution legally empowering
the Applicant to make the
Application.

(B)
APPLICATION PROCEDURE
AND REQUIREMENTS. Prior to
subdividing land in a manner, which
requires a Preliminary Plat, an Owner of the
land or his representative shall file an
Application for approval of a Preliminary
Plat. The Application shall:

(C)
REVIEW OF PRELIMINARY
PLAT. The Planning Department staff shall
schedule the Preliminary Plat for review by
the Development Review Committee,
including officials or agencies of the local
government, adjoining counties or
municipalities, school and special districts,
and other official bodies as it deems
necessary or as mandated by law, including
any review required by metropolitan,
regional, or state bodies under applicable
state or federal law.

(1)
Be made on a form available
at the office of the Planning
Department and determined
complete. A complete Application
shall include all elements of the
Subdivision and shall produce all
information required by the
Subdivision Application.

vi)

The Planning Department shall request that
all officials and agencies, to whom a request
for review has been made, submit their
report to the Staff. The Staff will consider
all reports submitted by the officials and
agencies concerning the Preliminary Plat and
shall prepare a staff report for proposed
action to the Planning Commission for the
next available regular meetings.

(2)
Include all contiguous
holdings of the Owner, unless
specifically waived by the Planning
Department and Planning
Commission, including land in the
"same ownership," as defined herein,
with an indication of the portion
which is proposed to be subdivided,
accompanied by an affidavit of
ownership, which shall include the
dates the respective holdings of land
were acquired, together with the
book and page of each conveyance to
the present Owner as recorded in the
County Recorder's office. The
affidavit shall advise as to the legal
Owner of the Property, the contract
Owner of the Property, the date a

Once an Application is received, the Staff
will work diligently to review the
Application as quickly as time and workload
allows. The scale or complexity of a project
or Staff workload may necessitate a longer
processing period. In ·such cases, the Staff
will notify the Applicant when an
Application is filed as to the projected time
frame.
(D)
PLANNING COMMISSION
REVIEW OF PRELIMINARY PLAT.
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exhibits submitted at the public hearing, the
Applicant shall be advised of any required
changes and/or additions. One copy of the
proposed Preliminary Plat shall be returned
to the Developer with the date of approval,
conditional approval, or disapproval and the
reasons therefore accompanying the plat.
The other copy shall be maintained in the
Planning files.

The Planning Commission shall study the
Preliminary Plat and the report of the Staff,
taking into consideration requirements of
Land Management Code, any Master Plan,
site plan, or Sensitive Land Analysis
approved or pending approval on the subject
Property. Particular attention will be given
to the arrangement, location and width of
Streets, their relation to sewerage disposal,
drainage, erosion, topography and natural
features of the Property, location of
Physical Mine Hazards and geologic
hazards, Lot sizes and arrangement, the
further Development of adjoining lands as
yet un-subdivided, and the requirements of
the Official Zoning Map, General Plan, and
Streets Master Plan, as adopted by the
Planning Commission and City Council. The
Planning Commission shall make a finding
as to whether there is Good Cause in
approving the preliminary plat.

(G)
PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS. The
Planning Commission may require that all
public improvements be installed and
dedicated prior to the signing of the final
Subdivision Plat by the Chairman of the
Planning Commission. If the Planning
Commission elects not to require that all
public improvements be installed and
dedicated prior to signing of the final
Subdivision Plat by the Chairman of the
Planning Commission, the amount of the
Guarantee, in compliance with the
requirements of the Land Management
Code, shall be established by the P tanning
Commission based upon the
recommendation of the City Engineer, which
shall be submitted by the Applicant at the
time of Application for final Subdivision
Plat approval. The Planning Commission
shall require the Applicant to indicate on
both the Preliminary and Final Plat all roads
and public improvements to be dedicated, all
special districts for water, fire, and utility
improvements which shall be required to be
established or extended, all City approved
Street names and addresses, and any other
special requirements deemed necessary by
the Planning Commission in order to
conform the Subdivision Plat to the Official
Zoning Map and the Master Plans of Park
City.

(E)
PUBLIC HEARINGS. The
Planning Commission shall hold a public
hearing on the Preliminary Plat Application.
Such hearings shall be advertised in
accordance with the requirements of Section
15-1-12 of the Land Management Code and
in the same manner as the subsequent public
hearings of the final Subdivision Plat;
except, however, that the Planning
Commission may, at its sole discretion,
combine the required hearings for both
preliminary and final Subdivisi_on Plat
approval.
(F)
PRELIMINARY APPROVAL.
After the Planning Commission has
reviewed the Preliminary Plat and the report
of the Staff including any municipal
recommendations and testimony and
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accordance with the requirements of Section
15-1-12 ofthc Land Management Code.

(II)
EFFECTIVE PERIOD OF
PRELIMINARY APPROVAL. The
approval of a Preliminary Plat shall be
effective for a period of one (I) year at the
end of which time final approval on the
Subdivision must have been obtained from
the Planning Commission, and the Final plat
shall be signed and filed with the County
Recorder within one ( l) year of approval.
Any plat not recorded within the period of
time set forth herein shall be null and void,
and the Developer shall be required to
resubmit a new Application and plat for
preliminary approval subject to all new
review requirements, zoning restrictions and
Subdivision regulations.
Gj

(I)
ZONING REGULATIONS. Every
plat shall conform to existing zoning
regulations and Subdivision regulations
applicable at the time of proposed final
approval, except that any plat which has
received preliminary approval shall be
exempt from any subsequent amendments to
the Land Management Code rendering the
plat nonconforming as to bulk or Use,
provided the final approval is obtained
within the one (1) year period.

15-7.1-6.
PLAT.

FINAL SUBDIVISION

(A)
APPLICATION PROCEDURE
AND REOumEMENTS. Following

Applicants may request time extensions of
the approval of a Preliminary Plat by
submitting a request in writing to the
Planning Department prior to expiration of
the approval. The Planning Director shall
review all requests for time extensions of
Preliminary Plat approvals and may consider
the request when the Applicant is able to
demonstrate no change in circumstance that
would result in an unmitigated impact or
that would result in a finding of noncompliance with the Park City General Plan
or the Land Management Code in effect at
the time of the extension request. Change in
circumstance includes physical changes to
the Property or surroundings. Notice shall be
provided consistent with the requirements
for Preliminary Plat in Section 15-1-12.

approval of the Preliminary Plat, if
necessary, the Applicant, ifhe wishes to
proceed with the Subdivision, shall file with
the Planning Department an Application for
approval of a final Subdivision Plat. The
Application shall:
Be made on forms available
(1)
at the Planning Department and
determined complete. A complete
Application shall include all
elements of the Subdivision and shall
produce all information required by
the Subdivision Application.
(2)
Include all contiguous
holdings of the Owner, unless
specifically waived by the Planning
Department and Planning
Commission, including land in the
"same ownership," as defined herein,

The Commission may hold a public hearing
on the time extension for a Preliminary Plat
approval. Such hearings shall be noticed in
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report to the Staff. The Staff will consider
all the reports submitted by the officials and
agencies concerning the Final Subdivision
Plat and shall submit a report for proposed
action to the Planning Commission.

with an indication of the portion
which is proposed to be subdivided,
accompanied by an affidavit of
ownership, which shall include the
dates the respective holdings of land
were acquired, together with the
book and page of each conveyance to
the present Owner as recorded in the
County Recorder's office. The
affidavit shall advise as to the legal
Owner of the Property, the contract
Owner of the Property, the date a
contract of sale was executed, and, if
any corporations are involved, a copy
of the resolution legally empowering
the Applicant to make the
Application.

Once an Application is received, the Staff
will work diligently to review the
Application, as quickly as time and
workload allows. The scale or complexity of
a project or Staff workload may necessitate a
longer processing period. In such cases the
Staff will notify the Applicant when an
Application is filed as to the projected time
frame.

(C)
PLANNING COMMISSION AND
CITY COUNCIL REVIEW OF FINAL
SUBDIVISION PLAT. The Planning
Commission shall review the Final
Subdivision Plat and the report of the Staff,
taking into consideration requirements of the
Land Management Code, the General Plan,
and any Master Plan, site plan, or Sensitive
Lands Analysis approved or pending on the
Property. Particular attention will be given
to the arrangement, location and width of
Streets and their relation to sewerage
disposal, drainage, erosion, topography and
natural features of the Property, location of
Physical Mine Hazards and Geologic
Hazards, Lot sizes and arrangement, the
further Development of adjoining lands as
yet un-subdivided, requirements of the
Preliminary Plat (if a Preliminary Plat was
required), and requirements of the Official
Zoning Map and Streets Master Plan, as
adopted by the Planning Commission and
City Council.

(3)
Include the entire
Subdivision, or section thereof,
which derives access from an
existing state, county or local
government highway.

REVIEW OF FINAL
(B)
SUBDMSION PLAT.
The Planning Department staff shall
schedule the Final Plat Application for
review by the Development Review
Committee, including officials or agencies
of the local government, adjoining counties
or municipalities, school and special
districts, and other official bodies as it
deems necessary or as mandated by law,
including any review required by
metropolitan, regional, or state bodies under
applicable state or federal law.
The Planning Department shall request that
all officials and agencies, to whom a request
for review has been made, submit their
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The Planning Commission shall make a
finding as to Good Cause prior to making a
positive recommendation to City Council.

stipulated by the City Council for
completion of required
improvements exceed two (2) years
from the date of the final ordinance.

(1)
The Planning Commission
shall give notice pursuant to Section
15-1-12 of this Code and hold a
public hearing on the proposed final
Subdivision Plat before making its
final recommendation to the City
Council.

(5)
Extension of Approval.
Applicants may request time
extensions of the City Council
approval by submitting a request in
writing to the Planning Department
prior to expiration of the approval.
The City Council may grant an
extension to the expiration date when
the Applicant is able to demonstrate
no change in circumstance that
would result in an unmitigated
impact or that would result in a
finding of non-compliance with the
Park City General Plan or the Land
Management Code in effect at the
time of the extension request.
Change in circumstance includes
physical changes to the Property or
surroundings. Notice shall be
provided consistent with the
requirements for a Final Plat in
Section 15-1-12.

(2)
After considering the final
Subdivision Plat and proposed
ordinance, the Planning Commission
shall recommend to the City Council
approval or disapproval of the
Subdivision Application and set forth
in detail any conditions to which the
approval is subject, or the reasons for
disapproval.
(3)
The City Council may adopt
or reject the ordinance either as
proposed by the Planning
Commission or by making any
revision it considers appropriate.

(D)
SUBMISSION AND REVIEW.
Subsequent to the resolution of the Planning
Commission, one (1) paper copy of the
construction plans, and one copy of the
original Subdivision Plat on paper shall be
submitted to the Planning Department for
final review. No final approval shall be
endorsed on the plat until the staffs review
has indicated that all requirements of the
ordinance have been met.

(4)
In the final ordinance the City
Council shall stipulate the period of
time when the Final Plat shall be
recorded and when the performance
Guarantee shall be filed or the
required improvements installed,
whichever is applicable. Provided,
however, that no plats will be
approved or released for recording
until necessary Guarantees have been
established in accordance with the
Land Management Code. In no
event shall the period of time

(E)
VESTED RIGHTS. Vesting for
purposes of zoning occurs upon the filing of
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Right-of-Way, consent to the
Lot Line Adjustment;

a complete Application provided, however,
that no vested rights shall accrue to any plat
by reason of preliminary or final approval
until the actual signing of the plat by the
Chairman of the Planning Commission and
the Mayor of Park City. All requirements,
conditions, or regulations adopted by the
Planning Commission and City Council
applicable to the Subdivision or to all
Subdivisions generally shall be deemed a
condition for any Subdivision prior to the
time of the signing of the Final Plat by the
Chairman of the Planning Commission and
Mayor. Where the Planning Commission or
Council has required the installation of
improvements prior to signing of the Final
Plat, the Planning Commission or Council
shall not unreasonably modify the conditions
set forth in the final approval.

the Lot Line
(c)
Adjustment does not result in
remnant land;
(d)
the Lot Line
Adjustment, and resulting
Lots comply with LMC
Section 15-7.3 and are
compatible with existing lot
sizes in the immediate
neighborhood;
(e)
the Lot Line
Adjustment does not result in
violation of applicable zoning
requirements;

(F)
LOT LINE ADJUSTMENTS. The
Planning Director may approve a Lot Line
Adjustment between two (2) Lots without a
plat amendment, within the corporate limits
of Park City, if:

(f)
neither of the original
Lots were previously adjusted
under this section;

(g)
written notice was
mailed to all Owners of
Property within three hundred
feet (300') and neither any
Person nor the public will be
materially harmed by the
adjustment; and

(I)
the Owners of both Lots
demonstrate, to the satisfaction of the
Planning Director that:
no new developable
(a)
Lot or unit results from the
Lot Line Adjustment;

(h)
the City Engineer and
Planning Director authorizes
the execution and recording
of an appropriate deed and
Plat, to reflect that the City
has approved the Lot Line
Adjustment.

(b)
all Owners of
Property contiguous to the
adjusted Lot(s) or to Lots
owned by the Applicant(s)
which are contiguous to the
adjusted Lot(s), including
those separated by a public
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(i)
Extension of
Approval. Applicants may
request time extensions of the
Lot Line Adjustment
approval by submitting a
request in writing to the
Planning Department prior to
expiration of the approval.
The Planning Director shall
review all requests for time
extensions of Lot Line
Adjustments and may grant a
one year extension.

@

(;;j
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Extension requests may be
granted when the Applicant is
able to demonstrate no
change in circumstance that
would result in an
unmitigated impact or that
would result in a finding of
non-compliance with the
Park City General Plan or the
Land Management Code in
e:ffect at the time of the
extension request. Change in
circumstance includes
physical changes to the
Property or surroundings.
Notice shall be provided
consistent with the
requirements for Lot Line
Adjustments in Section 15-112.

~

~
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If, based upon noncompliance with Subsection (1), the
Planning Director denies the Lot
Line Adjustment, the Director shall
inform the Applicant(s) in writing of
the reasons for denial, of the right to
(2)

~

appeal the decision to the Planning
Commission, and of the right to file a
formal plat amendment Application.

COMBINATION OF
ADJOINING CONDOMINIUM UNITS
WITH A CONDOMINIUM RECORD
OF SURVEY PLAT
(G)

(1) Subject to the condominium
declaratfan, a unit owner after acquiring
an adjoining unit that shares a common
wall with the unit owner's unit and after
recording an amended condominium
record of survey plat in accordance with
this Title, a unit owner may:
(a) remove or alter a partition
between the unit owner's unit
and the acquired unit, even if the
partition is entirely or partly
common areas and facilities; or
(b) create an aperture to the
adjoining unit or portion of a
unit.
(2) A unit owner may not take this
action if such action would:
(a) impair the structural integrity
or mechanical systems of the
building or either unit;
(b) reduce the support of any
portion of the common areas
and facilities or another unit;
(c) constitute a violation of Utah
Code Section 10-9a-608, as
amended, or violate any

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

section of this code of the

shown by a certificate signed by the
City Engineer and City Attorney that
the necessary dedication of public
lands and improvements has been
accomplished.

me.
(3) Approval of a condominium plat
amendment to combine units does not
change an assessment or voting right
attributable to the unit owner's unit or
the acquired unit, unless the declaration
provides otherwise.

(3)
The plat shall be signed by
the City Engineer, City Attorney and
the City Recorder, if the plat meets
the requirements herein.

(Amended by Ord. Nos. 06-22; JJ-05; 1535)

The plat shall conform to
(4)
City ordinances and be approved by
the culinary water authority and the
sanitary sewer authority.

15-7.1-7.
SIGNATURES AND
RECORDING OF THE PLAT.
(A)

(5)
The City may withhold an
otherwise valid plat approval until
the Owner of the land provides the
City Council with a tax clearance
indicating that all taxes, interest, and
penalties owing on the land have
been paid.

SIGNING OF PLAT.
( 1)
When a Guarantee is
required, the Chainnan of the
Planning Commission and Mayor
shall endorse approval on the plat
after the Guarantee has been
approved by the City Council, or its
administrative designee and all the
conditions of the ordinance
pertaining to the plats have been
satisfied.

(6)
a Subdivision Plat recorded
without the required signatures is
void.

(B)
RECORDING OF PLAT. It shall
be the responsibility of the Developer's
licensed title company to file the original
Mylar plat with the County Recorder within
thirty (30) days of the date of signature.
Simultaneously with the filing of the plat,
the licensed title company shall record the
agreement of dedication together with such
legal documents as shall be required to be
recorded by the City Attorney.

(2)
When installation of
improvements prior to plat
recordation is required, the Chairman
of the Planning Commission and
Mayor shall endorse approval on the
plat after all conditions of the
ordinance have been satisfied and all
improvements satisfactorily
completed. There shall be written
evidence that the required public
facilities have been installed in a
manner satisfactory to the City as

(C)
SECTIONALIZING MAJOR
SUBDIVISION PLATS. Prior to granting
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final approval of a Major Subdivision Plat,
the Planning Commission and City Council
may permit the p1nt to he divided into two
(2) or more sections and may impose such
conditions upon the filing of the sections as
it may deem necessary to assure the orderly
Development of the plat. The Planning
Commission and City Council may require
that the performance Guarantee be in such
amount as is commensurate with the section
or sections of the plat to be filed and may
defer the remaining required performance
Guarantee principal amount until the
remaining sections of the plat are presented
for filing. The Developer may also file
irrevocable offers to dedicate Streets and
public improvements only in those sections
submitted to be filed and defer filing offers
of dedication for the remaining sections until
such sections, subject to any additional
conditions imposed by the Planning
Commission, and offers shall be granted
concurrently with final approval of the
balance of the plat. The approval of all
remaining sections not filed with the County
Recorder shall automatically expire unless
such sections have been approved for filing
by the Planning Commission, all fees paid,
all instruments and offers of dedication
submitted and performance Guarantees
approved and actually filed with the County
Recorder within one (1) year of the date of
final Subdivision approval of the
Subdivision Plat. See Section 15-7.1-6 of
these regulations.
(Amended hy Ord. No. 06-22)
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